Assessing Instructed Feigner\u27s Response to the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale by Grabner, Stephen Scott
Nova Southeastern University
NSUWorks
College of Psychology Theses and Dissertations College of Psychology
1-1-2018
Assessing Instructed Feigner's Response to the
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale
Stephen Scott Grabner
stephensgrabner@gmail.com
This document is a product of extensive research conducted at the Nova Southeastern University College of
Psychology. For more information on research and degree programs at the NSU College of Psychology, please
click here.
Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cps_stuetd
Part of the Psychology Commons
All rights reserved. This publication is intended for use solely by faculty, students, and staff of Nova
Southeastern University. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted
in any form or by any means, now known or later developed, including but not limited to
photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written
permission of the author or the publisher.
This Dissertation is brought to you by the College of Psychology at NSUWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Psychology Theses and
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.
NSUWorks Citation
Grabner, S. S. (2018). Assessing Instructed Feigner's Response to the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale. .
Available at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/cps_stuetd/121
  
 
ASSESSING INSTRUCTED FEIGNER’S RESONSE TO THE GUDJONSSON 
SUGGESTIBILITY SCALE  
by 
Stephen S Grabner II 
 
A Dissertation Presented to the College of Psychology  
of Nova Southeastern University  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY  
2018 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
  
iii 
 
Statement of Original Work 
I declare the following: 
I have read the Code of Student Conduct and Academic Responsibility as described in the 
Student Handbook of Nova Southeastern University. This dissertation represents my 
original work, except where I have acknowledged the ideas, words, or material of other 
authors. 
 
Where another author’s ideas have been presented in this dissertation, I have 
acknowledged the author’s ideas by citing them in the required style.  
 
Where another author’s words have been presented in this dissertation, I have 
acknowledged the author’s words by using appropriate quotation devices and citations in 
the required style.  
 
I have obtained permission from the author or publisher—in accordance with the required 
guidelines—to include any copyrighted material (e.g., tables, figures, survey instruments, 
large portions of text) in this dissertation manuscript.  
 
 
Stephen Grabner    
Name  
 
 
14 AUG 2018 
Date  
 
 
 
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am deeply indebted to the many wonderful individuals who have supported me 
in completing this research endeavor. I would first like to thank Dr. David Shapiro, Dr. 
Lenore Walker, and Dr. Christian DeLucia for their assistance as both my dissertation 
committee and my mentors. Their patience and flexibility allowed me to engage in this 
pursuit of knowledge in ways I did not fathom when I began the program five short years 
ago. In addition, this research would not have been possible without the support of my 
research assistants, namely Brittany, Lauren, and Rose. They went above and beyond 
over the course of two years to ensure the project ran as smoothly as possible, and I am 
grateful for their contributions.  
I would be remiss if I did not thank my parents, Amy and Scott, as well as my 
brother, Nick, for their unconditional support. My family is the reason I entered the field 
of Psychology, and they instilled in me the values that guide me today. They continue to 
encourage my professional and personal growth, and I hope that I have made them proud. 
Lastly and most importantly, I want to give thanks to my wife, Elizabeth, who 
inspires and motivates me every day. May this be but one accomplishment of many on 
our lifelong voyage together.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix 
APPENDICIES .................................................................................................................. xi 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... xii 
CHAPTER I ........................................................................................................................ 1 
Statement of the Problem ................................................................................................ 1 
CHAPTER II ....................................................................................................................... 4 
Literature Review................................................................................................................ 4 
False Confessions................................................................................................................ 5 
False Confession Typology ............................................................................................. 8 
Protecting and Defending Against False Confessions ...................................................... 10 
Suggestibility, Compliance, and Acquiescence ............................................................ 14 
Suggestibility. ............................................................................................................ 15 
Interrogative Suggestibility. ...................................................................................... 16 
Suggestibility and Prevention of False Convictions ..................................................... 19 
Rules of evidence and false confession testimony admissibility. .............................. 20 
The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale ............................................................................... 22 
Creation and Development ............................................................................................ 22 
Administering the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale ..................................................... 23 
Scoring the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale................................................................ 25 
Interpreting Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scores ............................................................. 26 
Use of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale ................................................................. 28 
Manipulating Suggestibility Scores .................................................................................. 30 
Validity Indicators ......................................................................................................... 32 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale and Validity Indicators. ........................................ 33 
Empirical Research Regarding Feigning Suggestibility ................................................... 34 
Methods of Feigning Research ...................................................................................... 35 
Trends in GSS Scores .................................................................................................... 37 
Yield and Shift score relation. ................................................................................... 38 
Total Suggestibility score trends ............................................................................... 40 
Trends regarding Free Recall scores ......................................................................... 40 
vi 
 
Comparison to Vulnerable Populations ........................................................................ 42 
Impact of Baseline Suggestibility ................................................................................. 44 
Summary of Findings and Literature Critique .................................................................. 45 
Administration Discrepancies ....................................................................................... 45 
Justification for shortening the administration length. .............................................. 47 
Manipulating Cognitive Load ....................................................................................... 49 
Additional Administration Differences ......................................................................... 51 
Undergraduate Sample Comparisons ............................................................................ 52 
Intelligence .................................................................................................................... 53 
Additional Assessment of Valid Responding Pattern ................................................... 55 
Purpose of the Study ......................................................................................................... 57 
Research Hypotheses ........................................................................................................ 58 
Hypothesis 1: Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale Score Differences .............................. 59 
Hypothesis 1.1. .......................................................................................................... 59 
Hypothesis 1.2. .......................................................................................................... 59 
Hypothesis 1.3. .......................................................................................................... 59 
Hypothesis 1.4. .......................................................................................................... 59 
Hypothesis 1.5. .......................................................................................................... 59 
Hypothesis 1.6. .......................................................................................................... 59 
Hypothesis 2: Personality Assessment Inventory Validity Scale Differences .............. 60 
Hypothesis 2.1. .......................................................................................................... 60 
Hypothesis 2.2. .......................................................................................................... 60 
Hypothesis 2.3. .......................................................................................................... 60 
Hypothesis 2.4. .......................................................................................................... 60 
Hypothesis 3: Test of Memory Malingering Scale Differences .................................... 60 
Hypothesis 3.1. .......................................................................................................... 60 
Hypothesis 3.2. .......................................................................................................... 61 
Hypothesis 3.3. .......................................................................................................... 61 
Hypothesis 4: Gudjonsson Compliance Scale Score Differences ................................. 61 
Exploratory Analysis: Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale Mean Comparisons .............. 61 
CHAPTER III ................................................................................................................... 63 
Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 63 
vii 
 
Participants .................................................................................................................... 63 
Protection of Human Participants ................................................................................. 63 
Measures........................................................................................................................ 64 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale-1 (GSS-1).............................................................. 64 
Test of Memory Malingering. ................................................................................... 66 
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI). .................................................................. 67 
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale. ................................................................................. 68 
Demographic Questionnaire. ..................................................................................... 69 
Procedure ....................................................................................................................... 69 
Statistical Analysis ........................................................................................................ 72 
CHAPTER IV ................................................................................................................... 74 
Results ............................................................................................................................... 74 
Hypothesis 1 .................................................................................................................. 74 
Hypothesis 1.1. .......................................................................................................... 76 
Hypothesis 1.2. .......................................................................................................... 76 
Hypothesis 1.3. .......................................................................................................... 76 
Hypothesis 1.4. .......................................................................................................... 77 
Hypothesis 1.5 ........................................................................................................... 77 
Hypothesis 1.6. .......................................................................................................... 77 
Hypothesis 2 .................................................................................................................. 77 
Hypothesis 2.1. .......................................................................................................... 79 
Hypothesis 2.2 ........................................................................................................... 80 
Hypothesis 2.3 ........................................................................................................... 80 
Hypothesis 2.4 ........................................................................................................... 81 
Hypothesis 3 .................................................................................................................. 81 
Hypothesis 4 .................................................................................................................. 81 
Exploratory Analyses .................................................................................................... 82 
Comparison to previous literature. ............................................................................ 82 
Comparison to GSS-1 Normative sample. ................................................................ 83 
Comparison to intellectually disabled sample. .......................................................... 84 
Comparison to Frumkin, Lally, and Sexton (2012) US Forensic norms. .................. 85 
CHAPTER V .................................................................................................................... 87 
viii 
 
Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 87 
Interpretation of Hypothesis 1: Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale Findings .................. 87 
Free Recall Scores. .................................................................................................... 88 
GSS-1 Primary Scales. .............................................................................................. 89 
Comparison to Previous Literature ............................................................................... 90 
Proposed Interpretations. ........................................................................................... 91 
Hypotheses 2-4: Personality Assessment Inventory, Gudjonsson Compliance Scale, 
and Test of Memory Malingering Findings .................................................................. 93 
Integration of Findings and the Statement of the Problem ............................................... 96 
Limitations of the Study.................................................................................................... 98 
Implication for Future Research ..................................................................................... 100 
Clinical Implications ....................................................................................................... 101 
Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 103 
References ....................................................................................................................... 104 
APPENDICIES ............................................................................................................... 113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Adults in the General Population on the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scale-1, Gudjonsson 1997 
Table 2: Yield Score Comparison 
Table 3: Shift Score Comparison 
Table 4: Total Suggestibility Score Comparison 
Table 5: Free Recall Score Comparison 
Table 6: Comparisons to Vulnerable Populations’ GSS-1 Scores, Boon, Gozna, & Hall, 
2008 
Table 7: Comparison to Vulnerable Populations’ GSS-1 Scores, Hansen, Smeets, and 
Jelicic (2010) 
Table 8: Cognitive Load Comparisons, Drake et al., 2013 
Table 9: Correlation of WASI IQ with GSS and GCS, Sondenaa, Rasmussen, 
Palmstierna, and Nottestad, 2010 
Table 10: GSS Normative Sample, Gudjonsson, 1997 
Table 11: GSS Norms for Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities, Gudjonsson, 1997 
Table 12: GSS Test-Retest Correlation, Gudjonsson, 1987 
Table 13: Central Tendency and Variability for the GSS-1 
Table 14: Levene’s Test for the GSS-1 
Table 15: Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality for the GSS-1 
x 
 
Table 16: ANOVA Results for the GSS-1 
Table 17: Central Tendency and Variability for the PAI 
Table 18: Levene’s Test for the PAI 
Table 19: Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality for the PAI 
Table 20: ANOVA Results for the PAI 
Table 21: Welsh’s ANOVA Results for the PAI 
Table 22:  Central Tendency and Variability for the TOMM 
Table 23: One-Sample t-test comparison to Boon, Gozna, & Hall (2010) “Faking Bad” 
group 
Table 24: One-Sample t-test comparison to the GSS-1 normative sample (Gudjonsson, 
1997) 
Table 25: One-Sample t-test comparison to the intellectually disabled normative sample 
for the GSS-2 (Gudjonsson, 1997) 
Table 26: One-Sample t-test comparison between control group means 
Table 27: One-Sample t-test comparison between manipulation group means 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
APPENDICIES 
Appendix A: Previous Research Group Instructions 
Appendix B: Recruitment Flyer 
Appendix C: Informed Consent 
Appendix D: Demographics Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
ABSTRACT 
ASSESSING INSTRUCTED FEIGNER’S RESONSE TO THE GUDJONSSON 
SUGGESTIBILITY SCALE  
 
 
by: 
Stephen S. Grabner II 
Nova Southeastern University 
Research has suggested that the interrogative suggestibility levels play an important role 
in the elicitation of a false confession within a police interrogation. The Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scale (GSS-1) is currently the only validated assessment tool that measures 
interrogative suggestibility levels, and it is frequently used in forensic evaluations to help 
support or refute false confession claims. While it is imperative that the GSS-1 readily 
differentiate between those who are genuinely suggestible and those who are feigning 
higher suggestibility levels, past researchers have raised concerns regarding the 
layperson’s ability to feign higher suggestibility levels as measured by the GSS-1. This 
paper examines the ability to feign higher interrogative suggestibility levels as measured 
by the GSS-1 following instructions and incentive to engage in the manipulation. 
Undergraduate students from a local university (n=32) were randomly assigned to 
instructed feigners and a control group, and administered the GSS-1, as well as additional 
assessment tools with embedded validity indicators. Statistical Analyses, including one-
way analysis of variances (ANOVA) and one-sample t-tests were employed. Results 
indicate that while instructed feigners can successfully decrease their free recall scores 
when compared to controls, they cannot successfully manipulate principle measures on the 
primary GSS-1 scales. These findings support claims that the GSS-1 is robust to feigning 
efforts when administered as outlined in the instruction manual, as well as in conjunction 
with sufficient distractor tasks. These findings are explored in the context of the current 
feigning literature, and recommendations for future use of the GSS-1 in false confession 
evaluations are discussed.   
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CHAPTER I 
Statement of the Problem 
Over the past 30 years, researchers have begun to explore a phenomenon in which 
individuals falsely confess to crimes that they did not commit (Kassin & Wrightsman, 
1985). The increased attention to these false confession cases has led legal authorities and 
psychologists to critically examine factors that could lead to these false confessions 
occurring, primarily focusing on tactics utilized by police within an interrogation (Kassin 
et al., 2010). These efforts have increased awareness of the false confession phenomenon 
and have led to changes in the interrogation tactics utilized by interrogators, but has not 
eliminated the possibility of a false confession from being elicited throughout the course 
of an interrogation (Kassin et al., 2010). Further, these interrogative recommendations do 
not directly assist those who are currently incarcerated due, at least in part, to a false 
confession made in the period where these changes were not implemented during 
interrogative practice.  
For those who have falsely confessed to a crime, there are limited courses of action to 
establish their innocence after an admission of guilt (Kassin, 2012). If the evidence 
against an individual is limited to their retracted confession, the confessor has the burden 
of proving that the confession is false. Often a forensic psychologist serving in the role of 
an expert witness is utilized to support the veracity of the claim that their confession is 
untrue (Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 2012). This expert testimony could either discuss 
general factors that could lead a person to falsely confess to a crime they did not commit, 
or they could speak specifically to the case in question. In the latter, experts base their 
testimony on an examination of the interrogation that brought about the retracted 
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confession, as well as a psychological evaluation of the confessor.  
In these cases, psychologists are tasked to testify about the existence of false 
confessions, factors that can lead to the false confession being elicited, and sub case-
specific factors that led for the confession to be elicited in that specific situation 
(Frumkin, 2010). Factors relied upon when preparing for such testimony include, but are 
not limited to, interrogation tactics utilized when the confession was elicited, the length 
of the interrogation, and the personal characteristics of the confessor. Explorations of the 
factors within the interrogation are then juxtaposed with individual assessments of the 
alleged confessor, often gathered through clinical assessment tools, that together help 
substantiate qualitative claims of a false confession being elicited (Frumkin, Lally, & 
Sexton, 2012). 
To better support a false confession claim, an expert witness is likely to include the 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale-1 (GSS-1) as part of the psychological battery 
administered to the alleged confessor. The GSS-1 is a validated clinical assessment tool 
that can help highlight vulnerabilities that an individual could exhibit when faced with 
the unique pressures present within police interrogations (Kassin et al., 2010). The GSS-1 
is often cited as an important factor in these evaluations of false confession claims to 
assess an individual’s vulnerabilities as they relate to the context of a police interrogation 
(Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 2012). Of note, the GSS-1 does not contain validity 
indicators, which raises concerns regarding how the assessment reacts to individuals who 
may attempt to manipulate their verbal behaviors in response to the assessment.   
Previous research has explored the layperson’s ability to manipulate their suggestibility 
scores as measured by the GSS-1, showing mixed ability to manipulate at least some of 
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the subscales following instruction. This raises concerns regarding the ability for the 
GSS-1 to discern credible test-takers from ingenuine responders. 
While there is an existing literature base that examines the layperson’s ability to 
manipulate GSS-1 scores following written instructions, this study addresses 
methodological concerns within this research base and subsequently discusses how these 
may have impacted previous findings. Three major concerns will be addressed by the 
present study: first, the GSS-1 will be administered with its designated time delay to 
assess if this impacts the layperson’s ability to manipulate their responses. Second, 
instructed feigners will be presented with an additional incentive to engage in their 
manipulation instructions in an effort to mimic incentives in the forensic setting. Finally, 
participants will complete additional measures alongside the GSS-1 to better understand 
the overall impact of manipulation instructions. Results will be compared to existing 
datasets in order to understand ways in which laypersons respond to the GSS-1 following 
instructions to manipulate their response patterns. This will assist psychologists serving 
in the role of an expert witness to more astutely identify individuals who may attempt to 
manipulate their suggestibility scores and discuss assessments that may be administered 
alongside the GSS in a psychological battery in evaluations of false confession claims. 
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CHAPTER II 
Literature Review 
Over the past three decades, DNA evidence has become the gold-standard to help 
bolster accusations of guilt, as well as attestations of innocence; this is particularly true in 
more serious cases involving murder, arson, and rape (Saks & Koehler, 2005). DNA 
evidence is widely believed to be an unequivocal liberator in all criminal cases, to such a 
degree that it’s presence is “presumed to be the ultimate safeguard preventing wrongful 
convictions” (p. 127; Appleby & Kassin, 2016). Despite this prevailing belief, DNA is 
estimated to be present in only 20% of cases of violent crimes (Gould & Leo, 2010) and 
even less prevalent in non-violent cases. Further, while DNA flourishes as incriminating 
evidence, research assessing the utility of DNA as exculpatory evidence with lay jury 
members shows much narrower utility (Appleby & Kassin, 2016).  
With such limited availability of DNA evidence in violent and serious crimes, and 
even sparser presence in non-violent crimes, police and prosecutors must rely on the 
historical crown jewel of evidence: a confession elicited from an alleged perpetrator. 
Confessions, ranging from brief admissions of guilt to full narrative of the crime in 
question (Kassin, 2012), remain one of the strongest pieces of evidence establishing guild 
within in the criminal justice system (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Kassin & Neumann, 1997). 
Confession evidence is considered to be so strong that, following a confession being 
elicited, the investigation is often hastily concluded so that trial procedures can begin 
(Leo & Ofshe, 1998). Within cases in which confession evidence is present, a guilty 
verdict is almost inevitable due to the weight it is given, even compared to eyewitness 
testimony (Kassin & Neumann, 1997).  
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To claim that confession evidence is weighed heavily in the jurisprudence process 
is an understatement. To many players within the criminal justice system, a guilty verdict 
may appear intuitive in cases where the defendant confesses to serious crime such as 
murder, arson, or rape (Kassin, 2012). Research has shown that a confession, even when 
retracted, is given undue influence by both lay jurors (Redlich, Ghetti, & Quas, 2008) and 
judges alike (Wallace & Kassin, 2012). This is likely because, in the majority of criminal 
cases, a confession is a true indicator of guilt. Often confession narratives offer additional 
information that corroborate the individuals guilt, such as containing facts about the 
crime not known to the public, or leading investigators to undiscovered evidence (Leo & 
Ofshe, 1998). Based on its history, “because a confession is universally treated as 
damning and compelling evidence of guilt, it is likely to dominate all other case evidence 
and lead a trier of fact to convict the defendant” (p.429, Leo & Ofshe, 1998). 
False Confessions 
Despite the inherent trust that has been placed in confession evidence, history has 
demonstrated that confessions are not always accurate. Rather, researchers suggest that 
confession evidence falls on a continuum between a true and false confession, that varies 
based on the specific factors contained within the confession (Frumkin, 2008). A false 
confession is defined as a false statement, or a series of false statements, made in which 
an individual indicates an admission of guilt to a crime of which they are factually 
innocent (Kassin, 2017). This phenomenon is counter to the laypersons’ common sense 
and may be hard to conceptualize (Henkel, Coffman, & Dailey, 2008). Yet, there are 
volumes of evidence documenting individuals who have falsely confessed to crimes that 
they have not committed.  
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Examples are readily available throughout history, with cases seen in early United 
States history in cases where many women were condemned to death based on beliefs 
that they were practicing witchcraft; this is better known as the Salem Witch Trials of the 
1690s. Based on suspicion alone, women were confined and interrogated regarding 
alleged practices of witchcraft. While some withstood the questioning and confinement 
that accompanied these accusations, others confessed to escape torturous interrogation 
techniques. Because of these confessions, many women were sentenced to death and 
subsequently hung (See: Kassin, 2008). These were not the first documented cases of 
false confessions within history, and they are not the last false confessions to come about 
using techniques akin to torture. 
Inflicting pain or torturing suspects in the context of police interrogations was 
common practice prior to the 20th century, to such a degree that the United States 
Supreme Court needed to intervene. In Brown v. Mississippi (1936), it became law that 
physical interrogation techniques were unconstitutional. With torture removed from the 
repertoire of interrogators, police interrogation tactics within the United States shifted to 
using psychological approaches to bolster efficiency in garnering confessions (Kassin et 
al., 2018). Manuals such as Criminal Interrogations and Confessions (Inbau & Reid, 
1962) became widely disseminated to help train interrogators in these psychological 
approaches. Techniques found in this manual are collectively known today as the ‘Reid 
Method’ (Leo, 2008). Currently on its fifth edition (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 
2013), the Reid Method has become the centerpiece of criminal investigations for the past 
half-decade and is utilized almost unanimously in police interrogations throughout the 
nation (Kassin et al., 2010). 
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While it could be easy to write off false confessions as byproducts of early 
American frontier justice that disappeared after the movement from physical to 
psychological interrogation tactics, this is unfortunately not the case. Over the past thirty 
years, psychologists and legal authorities have continued to identify false confessions 
elicited in interrogations that utilize psychological tactics within the Reid Method (Kassin 
et al., 2010). The false confessions cases identified led to a variety of consequences, 
ranging from brief false imprisonments to individuals currently incarcerated due, at least 
in part, to a confession to a crime they did not factually commit (see: Leo & Ofshe, 1998; 
Perske, 2008; Perske, 2011). To better identify and assist individuals negatively impacted 
by false confessions, organizations such the Innocence Project have been established 
(www.innocenceproject.org).  
Over the past 16 years, the Innocence Project has spearheaded the exoneration of 
at least 350 people in the United States through advocating for examining DNA evidence. 
Within these initial 350 cases, false confessions were found to a contributing factor in at 
least 28% of cases (Kassin, Redlich, Alceste, & Luke, 2018). This does not accurately 
represent the true number of false confession cases throughout history, which is likely 
much higher. However, much of the work completed by these organizations have been 
with male exonerees, likely due to the increased readiness of DNA evidence to assist 
their exoneration. This does not consider cases in which women falsely confessed, which 
indicates that these estimations may be lower than the true base rate of false confessions 
in today’s criminal justice system (Walker, Conte, & Grabner, 2014).  
It is difficult to determine the base rate for the frequency for wrongful convictions 
or the frequency in which false confessions are elicited because these numbers are not 
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collected and very difficult to measure. However, it is possible to extrapolate from 
similar date. For example, within capital cases the conviction error rate is estimated to be 
between 3.3 and 5% (Risinger, 2007). Such prevalence shows the scope of the issue in 
today’s criminal justice system, and indicates that the problem deserves continued 
exploration in both the research and judicial realms.  
False Confession Typology 
False confessions are considered a significant contributing factor in wrongful 
conviction cases throughout history (Leo & Ofshe, 1998), yet it has only been within the 
last several decades that researchers have attempted to systematically identify cases and 
examine this phenomenon. Kassin and Wrightsman (1985) were the first to introduce a 
classification system to better understand and identify the mechanisms that influence the 
elicitation of a false confession in the context of police interrogations. Their research 
identified three different categories of false confessions: voluntary confessions, coerced-
compliance confessions, and coerced-internalized confessions.  
Voluntary confessions are classified as false assertions of guilt without an 
identifiable external source of pressure on the individual to confess to the crime. Factors 
that could lead an individual to a voluntary false confession include mental illness (e.g. 
schizophrenia or other delusions) or seeking notoriety from subsuming the identity of the 
factually guilty party. Coerced-compliant false confessions cases are identified when a 
person admits culpability verbally in the context of an interrogation, while internally 
maintaining their innocence. These cases result from an individual succumbing to 
pressures to escape the interrogation, and are marked by swift recantations when the 
individual is removed from the stressors of the interrogation environment. Often this 
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would account for acquiescence and compliance to interrogative questioning rather than 
truly believing what is being said. Third, coerced-internalized confessions represent 
admissions of guilt which are accompanied by the individual internally accepting 
responsibility for the crime. In these cases, the person leaves the interrogation with the 
belief that they, at least in part, were guilty of the crime in question. This is often 
maintained following removal from the pressures of the interrogative setting for a period 
of time. Coerced confessions highlight the role of the interrogation on the elicitation of a 
false confession, and have garnered the most literature (see Kassin et al., 2010). 
However, it is understood that not all pressures come from the interrogative 
environment. McCann (1998) proposed that external influences could also impact the 
verbalization of false confessions, leading to a fourth category: coerced-reactive. This 
could include pressures to confess to protect a true perpetrator, or threats made outside of 
the interrogation that influence verbal behavior during the interrogation. These have 
become increasingly noted in female false confession cases, where confessions are 
elicited to protect a significant other (Grabner, Conte, Walker, Nagle, & Shaprio, 2015). 
More recently, Frumkin (2010) proposed that in some cases individuals have committed a 
plethora of prior offences and subsequently confess to a crime they did not commit due to 
the cofession; these cases would be classified as coerced-substituted false confessions.  
Although these five false confession types may not be detailed enough to 
encompass all the nuances contained within each situation in which a false confession is 
elicited, Kassin and Wrightsman’s false confession typology is most commonly utilized 
by researchers to discuss broader trends within the false confession cases of the 20th and 
21st century. This allows for more detailed discussion of individual pressures within the 
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interrogative setting, individual factors such as level of concern regarding social 
approval, as well as levels of suggestibility. It is from this framework that researchers 
have broadly explored factors that lead to these confession types, as well as explored 
means by which these vulnerabilities within the legal process can be neutralized.  
Protecting and Defending Against False Confessions 
Given the weight which confession evidence is given in the court of law, 
researchers and legal authorities have increasingly focused on how to prevent false 
confessions from being elicited within an interrogation. While this assists in increasing 
the effectiveness of interrogation tactics and decreasing the base rate of false confessions 
to some degree, additional efforts are necessary to help defend those who have already 
falsely confessed and must battle their own confession (Leo & Ofshe, 1998).  
Challenging the veracity of confession is relatively new concept within the courts, 
with a lot of development within the 1980s. Colorado v. Connelly (1986) upheld that 
statements, even those given while suffering from symptoms of a mental illness such as 
delusions, were admissible and collecting incriminating statements as evidence did not on 
its own violate the fifth or fourteenth amendment. This sets the president for specific 
evidence of coercion being required to violate the Due Process Clause, but made no 
mention of what could occur if coercion was present. 
Prior to Crane v. Kentucky (1986), the reliability of the confession was not able to 
be challenged within the trial. In this case, a 16-year-old boy falsely confessed to a 
murder following a lengthy interrogation. During his trial, Crane’s defense team was not 
permitted to introduce testimony discussing facts about the interrogation because the trial 
court would not admit testimony that only served to discuss the issue of the voluntariness 
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of the confession. This was upheld by the Kentucky Supreme court; however, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled unanimously that this right was protected by the Confrontation 
Clause of the 6th Amendment and the Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment (Crane 
v. Kentucky, 1986). Following this ruling, it became possible for defendants to introduce 
evidence that helped give credence to their claims of false confessions.  
Over the past thirty years, Crane v. Kentucky (1986) has set the legal precedent 
for examining confession veracity. In the instances where this avenue is pursued, forensic 
psychologists are called to testify in order to support the trier of fact understand false 
confessions as a psychological construct and the process in which they can be elicited 
(Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 2012). However, the true utility in expert witness testimony 
occurs when the psychologist can provide both general information regarding the 
elicitation of false confession as well as case-specific information.  
For experts who are called to provide case-specific false confession testimony, 
Frumkin (2010) offers helpful guidelines that help identify constructs that should be 
considered. This focuses on understanding and examining individual and interrogation 
factors that could have influenced the individual during the interrogation, which can be 
gathered through a psychological interview and a comprehensive psychological 
assessment battery. This should be followed by intensive examination of the available 
data from the interrogation such as a transcript, as well as audio or video recordings, 
when available (Frumkin, 2010). Conclusions drawn from this information should be 
connected to empirical research and then presented in a digestible manner to the judge 
and jury to help support their understanding of the case.  
To bolster the empirical support for these individual and interrogative factors 
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discussed in this testimony, the culmination of the individual risk factors must be 
examined to understand the system in which these confessions can occur. This process 
can be understood best by applying accident causation models such as the Cumulative 
Act Effects model (Reason, 2000) to help conceptualize the individual vulnerabilities and 
how those lead to adverse outcomes. The Cumulative Act Effects model was initially 
proposed to assess lapses and weaknesses in defensive systems that intend to prevent 
patient harm in hospital settings. As such, the model accounts for the many barriers that 
are already in place in a system as protective layers; individually, these layers have 
weaknesses but cumulatively decrease the chance of an adverse outcome occurring. 
Although the system is insufficient in stopping all adverse outcomes, by looking at the 
weakness in the individual layers it is possible to decrease the likelihood of future 
adverse outcomes that follow a similar trajectory. 
Examining the false confession process within a Cumulative Act Effects model 
clarifies the complex interaction that leads to a confession occurring, and highlights 
individual areas of risk that increased the opportunity for false confession to be elicited. 
An expert utilizing this model would examine the trajectory between the crime occurring 
and a false confession being elicited, which would help highlight unique vulnerabilities 
exhibited that may have led to the false confession being elicited. These include 
individual vulnerabilities, as well as police and interrogation factors that together 
impacted the elicitation of a false confessions. As Kassin (2017) states, “in the service of 
social justice, psychologists-armed not only with a cache of forensically focused studies 
and wrongful convictions but with core principles of psychology- are uniquely 
positioned” (p.959) to discuss the vulnerabilities present within the interrogation. By 
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looking at the interrogative process through this lens, experts can identify the areas that 
lead to the most adverse outcomes and identify additional safeguards that could prevent 
future negative outcomes following a similar trajectory. 
It should be noted that the majority of clinical and research attention within the 
false confession literature has been on police-centric interrogation factors. Examining 
these factors have highlighted many detrimental means by which false confessions have 
arisen based on police actions through the various stages of confinement and 
interrogation. For example, data suggests that police-centric factors such as mistaken 
eyewitness identification, utilizing interrogation tactics that result in false confessions, or 
investigators experiencing “tunnel vision” (p. 481, Gould & Leo, 2010) in which law 
enforcement becomes convinced of a suspect’s guilt to such a degree that they discount 
alternatives hypotheses with more credence. Further research has identified key 
interrogation techniques that are staples of the Reid Technique also significantly increase 
the likelihood of a false confession being elicited. Such tactics include maximizing the 
evidence police imply they have on a suspect (known as “Maximization”), minimizing 
the offense and the subsequent consequences of confessing (known as “Minimization”) 
and the presentation of outright false evidence. These tactics psychologically manipulate 
individual’s responses, leading to an increase in both false and true confessions (See 
Kassin et al., 2010 for full review on the status of this interrogation research).  
While researchers call for changes to the interrogation process such as mandatory 
video-recording of all police interrogation based on these findings (see Kassin et al., 
2010), it becomes imperative to also understand the individual factors that predispose a 
person to a higher likelihood of falsely confessing when exposed to these police-centric 
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factors. This line of research has identified unique variables that are present in the 
custodial and interrogation setting, and integrates an individual’s personal vulnerability 
into how they are conceptualized. In the forefront of the confession literature is 
examining the motivations for verbal behavior in an interrogation, as they represent how 
the police-centric factors are moderated by individual factors to lead to these false 
confessions. 
Suggestibility, Compliance, and Acquiescence  
To best understand why someone would falsely confess to a crime, researchers 
focus on the motivations of verbal behavior and intent of the verbalization. Gudjonsson 
(2003) highlighted three degrees by which false admissions could come about. The first is 
verbalizations that represent acquiescence to pressure, which have been widely 
understood within the literature as experiencing motivation to respond to questioning, 
often in the affirmative, to appease others without any internal processing regarding what 
is being verbalized or agreed to (Cronbach, 1946). However, in many cases there is a 
degree of internal consideration to what is being verbalized. The inclusion of such 
contemplation of the ramifications of the verbal behavior would be considered as either 
compliance or suggestibility. Compliance focuses on verbalizations that are not internally 
consistent with the person’s beliefs; rather, the person is simply complying with forces 
outside of themselves but internally maintaining their innocence. This is demonstrated in 
the coerced-compliance subtype of false confessions, and often marked by hasty 
recanting of confessions when free from the pressures. 
However, in some cases these statements are, at least for a short time, believed to 
be true. The construct of suggestibility helps conceptualize this internal acceptance of 
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what is being verbalized, representing an internal shift to accept it as the truth. This is 
conceptualized as a coerced-internalized false confession. This internalization process has 
been the primary focus of a complete branch of false confession research, as the shift in 
verbal behavior represents a different underlying mechanism than both acquiescence and 
compliance.  
Suggestibility. The definition of suggestibility has evolved throughout its lifetime 
as the understanding of what it means to be “suggestible” has been challenged by 
researchers over the past two centuries. Prior to the 20th century, the term suggestibility 
was primarily used when discussing participant’s response posthypnotic suggestions from 
a hypnotist. Suggestibility was thus viewed as an unconscious mechanism with little 
relevance in conscious decisions; therefore, there were no early attempts to measure it 
empirically. Suggestibility remained in the shadows of the unconscious until 1886, when 
researchers such as James Cattell began studying witness memory and testimony to 
understand the level of subjectivity of memories.  
Cattell’s research began by exposing Colombia students to a staged event and 
subsequently asking questions about what the students had seen. In addition, students 
were asked to report their perceived confidence in their answers. Cattell found the 
confidence level in the responses did not correlate to accuracy; some individuals were 
confident without regard to the accuracy of their responses, while others were strikingly 
insecure about their responses despite being correct. His research was one of the first to 
help understand the volatile nature of witness memory, which at the time was considered 
to have high credibility. 
Following Cattell’s work, psychologists began to become more interested in 
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memory and its malleability. Alfred Binet (1900) performed a study measuring 
participant’s reaction to leading questions. He first showed participants various pictures, 
then asking participants to recall what they had seen. Notably, the wording of Binet’s 
questions conveyed a desired response from the participants. By using leading questions, 
Binet elicited distorted recollections of the image that the participants believed to be true. 
These findings cemented the foundation for research regarding the volatile nature of 
witness memory, and became a pivotal moment in suggestibility research. This was the 
first time that research had indicated that being suggestibility could be a conscious and 
active process that could be studied and measured. To understand the human experience 
as malleable rather than concrete allowed for lines of research questioning what exactly 
could change one’s memory, how likely that was to happen, and explore protective and 
risk factors for these memory distortions. 
Research then began differentiating “Primary” and “Secondary” suggestibility; 
primary suggestibility referred to the unconscious processes underlying the utility of 
hypnosis, while secondary suggestibility was outlined as the conscious process similar to 
gullibility (Eysenck & Furneaux, 1945). Here research split; the present line of research 
developed from the further exploration on secondary suggestibility, which was explored 
as the level of susceptibility to the influences of others on a conscious level. This 
secondary suggestibility allows for more specific and active research to isolate important 
influences in memory formation, as well as how individuals acted upon those memories.  
Interrogative Suggestibility. Although researcher have worked to explore the 
concept of suggestibility over the course of the eighty years following Cattell and Binet’s 
work, suggestibility and memory malleability seemed to be ignored in the context of 
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police interrogations. It is within this conscious process that the research delved to better 
understand the impact this plays within interrogations. Today, when considering 
suggestibility, which is defined as the likelihood “to believe that what someone says is 
true or may be true” (Suggestible, n.d.), indicating suggestibility is geared towards the 
more active and conscious process that Binet and Cattell offered. Although researchers 
were identifying the impact of interrogation stressors on false confessions (Kassin & 
Wrightsman, 1985) during this time, the underlying constructs that made the individuals 
more susceptible to these pressures were not yet clarified.  
It wasn’t until 1986 that Gudjonsson and Clark proposed a groundbreaking model 
of suggestibility specifically addressing interrogations, arguing that previous research on 
suggestibility did not accurately map onto the unique pressures present when individuals 
are interrogated in a custodial setting. Gudjonsson and Clark (1986) stated that previous 
understandings of suggestibility did not consider the nature of the power differential in 
custodial settings or the potential for false confessions within such interrogation. Further, 
there had been no consideration of how the implications of statements made in these 
situations impacted response patterns, as the consequences of this verbal behavior is 
unique to custodial and judicial settings. By not exploring these areas, Gudjonsson and 
Clarke argued that suggestibility studies conducted prior to that date were not relevant 
when attempting to understand any police interrogation, and that new paradigms were 
needed to explore these phenomena. 
Gudjonsson and Clark (1986) highlight several areas within interrogative situation 
that differ from other social interactions where suggestibility could impact the outcome of 
responses. When being interrogated in a custodial setting, they argue individuals 
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experience: 1) feelings of uncertainty about the correct answers to questions they are 
being asked; 2) feelings of being expected to know the correct answers; 3) negative 
feedback when responses are “incorrect;” and 4) feelings of rapport and trust 
(Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986). These factors intertwine as the interrogation continues, and 
over time place unique pressures on an individual being interrogated. Gudjonsson and 
Clark determined that a more clearly defined construct was necessary to adequately 
encompass these interrogative pressures. This was labeled as Interrogative Suggestibility 
(IS), and was defined as ‘‘the extent to which, within a closed social interaction, people 
come to accept messages communicated during formal questioning, as a result of which 
their subsequent behavioural response is affected’’ (Gudjonsson & Clark, 1986, p. 84). 
The authors note that this does not necessitate being interviewed by a police officer, but 
rather in any custodial setting that contains a similar power dynamic. 
Based on this understanding of IS, Gudjonsson and Clark proposed that two 
important forces at play within an interrogation, which they coined as “Yield” and 
“Shift.” Yield is an individual’s reaction to “give in” to a question that is leading in 
nature, such that there is a perceived expectation to answer in a certain way. Thus, an 
individual could yield to this pressure to give the interviewer the response that they 
convey as desired, with a belief that doing so would be beneficial for the individual in 
some way. In tandem with this process, shift refers to changing previous responses 
following receiving negative feedback from a person of authority regarding. Shift results 
in changing initial responses to please the authority figure. The pressure to yield when 
initially giving responses, as well as shifting previous responses, were proposed to work 
together during an interrogation to elicit both true and false confessions at higher rates. 
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Notably, some individuals are more likely to yield to this pressure than others, some are 
more likely to shift their responses, and others may not be impacted at all by the 
interrogative pressures. This highlights the importance of understanding not only whether 
these pressures are present, but also measuring the degree to which the person in the 
situation would be impacted by them.  
Together Yield and Shift helped define what Gudjonsson and Clark saw as the 
key factors that had yet to be explored when discussing the interrogation. The literature 
has begun to explore Yield, Shift, and Interrogative Suggestibility in various contexts to 
better understand how they could be manipulated (Roos & Gow, 2007), how they are 
modulated by levels of intelligence (Beail, 2002), and more specifically how they impact 
the elicitation of false confessions (Kassin et al., 2010). This conceptualization of 
interrogative factors paved a new road to understanding suggestibility in the interrogation 
context, but initially lacked a reliable way to measure and assess Yield and Shift levels in 
practice.  
Suggestibility and Prevention of False Convictions  
Having established the impact of Yield and Shift within the interrogation, it 
becomes imperative to consider how this information could be applied to the current 
difficulties posed by false confessions. While many researchers have utilized fruit from 
this research to inform calls for change within the interrogative process (See Kassin et al., 
2010 for a complete review), fewer have focused on how this information can help 
support those who have already confessed. As noted, many players in the legal system 
appear to believe false confessions are be counterintuitive at best, and therefore once a 
false confession has been elicited there are limited courses of action the individual can 
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take to establish their innocence (Leo & Ofshe, 1998).  
In the absence of other exonerating data such as DNA evidence, the defendant 
must attempt to challenge the veracity of their own confession in the court system. 
Kassin, Redlich, Alceste, and Luke (2018) examined the problem faced by defendants 
who must overcome their own confession. Often this is done using expert witness 
testimony, which helps either frame the existence of false confessions in general or 
addresses factors that led to the false confession within the specific case. The authors 
surveyed 131 experts who had published on interrogations and confessions to understand 
the acceptability and the influence of their testimony. Their results indicate that experts in 
the field estimated receiving 3,889 requests to testify relating to false confessions, of 
which they testified in approximately 1,647 cases, which almost exclusively was in 
service of the defense rather than the prosecution. With a such a large number of 
testimonies regarding false confessions as a whole, information regarding individual 
factors influencing false confessions become even more significant are to explore.   
Rules of evidence and false confession testimony admissibility. While 
confession evidence is generally accepted without significant questioning, for expert 
witness testimony to be accepted as evidence in the United States legal system it must 
rise to certain legal precedents; these are generally set by legal precedent such as U.S. 
Supreme Court rulings. Historically, evidence submitted to the court must meet what is 
known as the Frye test, which is based on Frye v. United States (1923) D.C. Court of 
Appeals ruling. The Frye test established the need for expert witness testimony to be 
based on research that was generally accepted by the relevant scientific community. 
While helpful in establishing the need for reliability of the information being accepting 
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into the courtroom, the general acceptability requirement is vague and its standards were 
not applied uniformly. Presently, only eight states exclusively rely on the Frye test as 
their standard for accepting expert witness testimony. 
The remaining thirty-nine states follow a more recent ruling following Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. (1993; Kassin et al., 2018). The Daubert rule, based 
on Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (1975), a U.S. Supreme court raised the 
need for research supporting expert witness testimony to not only be accepted in the 
scientific community, but to also be considered reliable and valid. The decision whether 
expert testimony is based on the current science resides with the judge, and they must 
determine whether this information assist the triers of fact in the current case (Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 1993). Together, these standards set the bar for 
psychological expert witness testimony; more importantly, it establishes the barriers that 
need to be overcome if trying to defend against a false confession. 
Kassin et al. (2018) indicated that for psychological experts testifying on false 
confession cases, the Daubert standards have been met based on both the large literature 
base as well as the large number of accepted testimonies they were able to identify in 
their sample. While an expert can testify regarding false confessions, there is no set 
standard on what kinds of information should be present in these testimonies or what 
areas should be addressed by the testimony. Suggestions are presented in Frumkin (2010) 
that focus on the use of reliable and valid measurement tools to examine the individual 
case in question, without which researchers would be left with presenting only facts about 
false confessions in general. To increase the precision of these testimonies, and to further 
support the Daubert requirements of being both reliable and relevant to the current case, 
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experts utilize specific assessment tools to help bolster their findings.  
The Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 
Although no standardized battery of assessments having been established when 
assessing false confession claims, specific tools have been developed that shed light on 
constructs specific to the enigma that is a false confession (Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 
2012). This paper will turn towards understanding the tools used to measure 
suggestibility as indicated by verbal behavior, namely the Gudjonsson Suggestibility 
Scale.  
Creation and Development 
During the late 1980s while involved as an expert witness in the United Kingdom, 
Gisli Gudjonsson was asked to assess the suggestibility level of multiple individuals with 
intellectual disabilities who were believed to have falsely confessed during a police 
interrogation. However, at this time there were no validated assessment tools in use that 
could assess interrogative suggestibility, namely the Shift and Yield constructs proposed 
in his newly proposed IS model (Gudjonsson, 1997). With no assessment tool viable for 
his needs, Gudjonsson found it necessary to “develop an instrument that could help 
identify people who were particularly susceptible to giving erroneous accounts of events 
when subjected to questioning” (p.3, Gudjonsson, 1997). He aimed to objectively 
measure the extent to which individuals gave into leading questions and how they 
responded to negative feedback in a constructed behavioral assessment. More 
importantly, for Gudjonsson it was paramount that the tool be empirically validated so 
that it could be admitted as a part of an evaluation completed within the criminal justice 
system. With this data, Gudjonsson intended to help identify those who may be 
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vulnerable in interrogations, or utilized in cases where a confession is retracted.  
Through his subsequent research, the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS-1; 
Gudjonsson 1984) was developed. An alternative form (GSS-2, Gudjonsson 1987) was 
later created to help understand test-retest reliability and broaden the range of 
applicability outside of the forensic context. Although the GSS-1 and GSS-2 are identical 
in administration format, they differ in narratives read out to the participant and the 
subsequent questions regarding that narrative: the GSS-1 contains a narrative about a 
fictitious robbery, whereas the GSS-2 contains a narrative about a bicycle accident 
without forensic implications. In the manual for the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale, 
Gudjonsson notes the GSS was developed to “measure objectively the vulnerabilities or 
proneness of people to give erroneous accounts when interviewed. The GSS-1 is 
particularly applicable to police interviewing contexts, but can be applied to any 
interview situation, including clinical practice.” (p.ix, Gudjonsson, 1997). By 
understanding how the individual responds to pressures in a simulated environment, it is 
possible to extrapolate how they would respond in an interrogative setting. Through 
careful administration, the GSS-1 provides valuable insight  
Administering the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 
To administer the GSS-1, it is important to first consider the environment and 
presentation of the tool. First, the individual should be placed in an environment that is 
similar to those found in an interrogation. The room is suggested to be neutrally 
decorated and only those administering or being administered the assessment should be 
present. The person who administers the GSS-1 is encouraged build rapport with the 
individual prior to beginning the test. To begin the assessments, the participants are first 
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informed that they are taking a memory test to conceal the true nature of the 
suggestibility measure; participants are not told about the true nature of the assessment. 
Participants are first asked non-standardized questions regarding their memory to solidify 
the presentation of the assessment as a memory test.  
The participants are then told the following verbatim: “I want you to listen to a 
short story. Listen carefully because when I am finished I want you to tell me everything 
you remember” (p.11; Gudjonsson, 1997). Participants are presented with a short 
narrative that contains 40 pieces of information about an incident; the GSS-1 narrative 
discusses a robbery, while the GSS-2 narrative discusses a bicycle accident. After the 
narrative is played once, participants are asked to recall as many aspects of the narrative 
as they can. All answers are intended to be recorded or written down verbatim by the 
researcher for scoring. Participants are asked to state as many facts from the story they 
can remember, but are given no feedback about the accuracy of their responses or overt 
encouragements. After discontinuation of spontaneous recall, participants are given 
unrelated distractor tasks for up to 50 minutes.  
Following this time delay, participants are again asked to recall as much of the 
initial story as they can and their responses are recorded; again, no feedback as to the 
accuracy of these statements are provided. Next, participants are asked twenty scripted 
questions about the narrative, which promote forced-choice responses (i.e., yes/no 
questions). Fifteen questions contain information not reported in the narrative, and thus 
are leading questions due to the manner in which they convey to the participant there is 
an answer in the responses presented. The responses to these questions is believed to be 
representative of the individual’s initial level of yield to leading questions. If the 
25 
 
 
 
participant does not give a clear response, they are asked to solidify their statement. Upon 
answering all twenty questions initially, all participants are told the following: “You have 
made a number of errors. It is therefore necessary to go through the questions once more, 
and this time try to be more accurate" (p. 4-5, Gudjonsson, 1997). This negative feedback 
is presented in a firm and clear manner, regardless of the participant’s actual responses to 
these questions. The participants are then asked the same questions that were presented 
prior to the negative feedback. Following the second administration of the questions, the 
assessment is complete. 
Scoring the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 
The GSS contains six main subscales that can be generated from the participant’s 
responses during the free recall and question response phases. The first two subscales, 
Immediate Recall and Delayed Recall, measures the number of aspects of the narrative 
that are correctly recalled during their respective recall phases. A maximum score of 
fourty correct aspects of the narrative could be recalled by participants during each recall 
period. Scoring information to help understand how to code these free response answers 
are outlined in the GSS manual (Gudjonsson, 1997), with partial remembering of facts 
also garnering some credit. 
The third and fourth subscales are the “Yield 1” and “Yield 2” scores, which 
indicates the number of leading questions the subject yielded to during the first and 
second questioning period, respectively. The significant difference is that Yield 2 scores 
follow the administration negative feedback. Both Yield 1 and Yield 2 have a maximum 
score of 15, as the five non-leading questions are not incorporated into this score. 
Participants who respond to leading questions with an affirmative are scored as having 
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yielded to the leading nature of the question. Additionally, participants who agree with 
either of the false alternative questions are scored as having yielded to the question. 
Examples of statements that qualify to be scored as a yield are found in the 
administration manual (Gudjonsson, 1997). 
The fifth main subscale, “Shift,” notes the number of significant changes in 
responses when comparing responses before and after the negative feedback 
administration. For example, participants who change an affirmative answer to a negative 
one are scored as shifting to the negative feedback. Shifted responses are measured for all 
20 questions, making it possible to measure changes in responses to non-leading and 
leading questions. The final subscale score is “Total Suggestibility,” which is the sum of 
Yield 1 and Shift scores, showing the level of IS as proposed by Gudjonsson and Clark 
(1986). Total Suggestibility scores ranges from 0 to 35, and accounts for both the reaction 
to leading questions and responses to negative feedback together.  
Supplemental scores can also be generated from examining the recalled aspects of 
the GSS-1 narrative. These scores represent the number of confabulations made by the 
participant; this can be broken down into distortions and fabrications of facts related to 
the narrative distinguish types of memory errors (Gudjonsson, Rutter & Clare, 1995). 
However, confabulation scores were not a part of the original form of the test and are 
infrequently used in forensic applications of the GSS-1 (Gudjonsson, 1997). 
Interpreting Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scores 
The GSS-1 scores are measures of “actual behavior in a brief interrogative 
situation (p.29, Gudjonsson, 1997), and give insight into how an individual may react in a 
similar custodial or interrogative situation in which they are presented leading questions 
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or negative feedback. Thus, behavioral comparisons could be made based on scores that 
vary when compared to appropriate normative samples. Gudjonsson (1997) identified 
means for multiple UK normative samples for use in score comparison for the GSS-1. 
These comparison samples include, among others, healthy adults in the general 
population (See Table 1), a court referral sample, an Icelandic prisoner sample, prison 
inmates, and juvenile offenders. Scores obtained should be compared to their appropriate 
normative group and use that comparison to “establish how unusual or abnormal the 
scores are” in comparison (p.29, Gudjonsson, 1997). Research has suggested that 
Interrogative Suggestibility is relatively stable across nationalities, and likely these norms 
are applicable cross-culturally for clinical interpretation (Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 
2012).  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Adults in the General Population on the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scale-1 
 Mean SD Range Std. Error 
Immediate Recall 21.3 7.1 4-36 2.78 
Delayed Recall 19.5 7.5 4-34.5 3.48 
Yield 1 4.6 3.0 0-13 1.36 
Yield 2 5.6 3.8 0-15 1.61 
Shift 2.9 2.5 0-12 1.00 
Total Suggestibility 7.5 4.6 0-21 1.64 
n=157; Gudjonsson, 1997 
When compared to the appropriate normative group, Yield 1 or Yield 2 scores can 
help psychologists understand how a participant responds to leading questions in similar 
settings. Higher scores as compared to the appropriate normative group would indicate 
that an individual is more likely in an interrogative setting to yield to pressures. Similarly, 
higher shift scores could be used to indicate a greater susceptibility to negative feedback. 
While interpretations of these scores do not directly determine whether a person falsely 
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confessed, they give a better understanding to a forensic psychologist as to the level in 
which the individual may be vulnerable to these pressures if they were present in the 
interrogation. For example, a finding of an individual with a high yield would be 
ineffective in supporting false confession claims in cases where an examination of the 
interrogation transcripts indicate the absence of leading questions. Similarly, while high 
shift scores compared to the appropriate norms could suggest a higher likelihood to 
change questions in response to negative feedback, it is imperative to evaluate the 
whether any negative feedback was administered during the interrogation in which an 
alleged false confession was elicited.   
Use of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale 
Due to the inherent trust that is offered to confession evidence (Kassin & 
Wrightsman, 1985), forensic psychologists must fight an uphill battle to help demonstrate 
that not only can confessions can be false, but how they are elicited in the context of a 
police interrogation. False confession cases that otherwise would fall to the whims of the 
criminal justice system now has support in their last lines of defense against a false 
conviction through an empirically supported evaluation conducted by a forensic 
psychologist (Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 2012). The GSS-1 is the only assessment tool 
for measuring interrogative suggestibility currently in use (Kassin et al., 2010), and as 
such it is most relevant for use in forensic evaluations where there is a question regarding 
the impact of interrogative pressures on the elicitation of a confession. While not the only 
relevant tool to these evaluations, it provides unique information to support claims that 
otherwise could not be empirically supported. 
Although initially developed for use in the United Kingdom, the Gudjonsson 
29 
 
 
 
Suggestibility Scale have been adapted for use international use. Researchers interested in 
utilizing the GSS-1 have used various translations, including Dutch (Merckelbach, Muris, 
Wessel, & van koppen, 1998), Polish (Polczyk, 2005), and English translations (Polczyk, 
2005), to name a few. Gudjonsson, Rutter and Clare (1995) attest that ethnicity has only 
minor influences on GSS-1 scores when controlling more influential factors such as 
memory, intelligence and anxiety. They suggest that their recommendations to 
conservatively interpret the results as compared to the normative sample adequately 
controls for any cross-cultural differences in normative comparison. Therefore with 
appropriate translations, the GSS-1 is available for use internationally without reports of 
validity interferance. 
To use the GSS-1 in the context of United States forensic evaluations, Frumkin, 
Lally and Sexton (2012) collected 334 individual GSS-1 protocols used in United States 
criminal evaluations as part of confession-related proceedings. For the US administration, 
the narrative and questions are edited such that that “holiday” is replaced with “vacation” 
and “pounds” is replaced with “dollars” to better reflect American nomenclature. The 
authors reported that when comparing their sample with samples from the United 
Kingdom and Iceland, differences were minimal: Yield 1 scores were similar, while 
Yield 2, Shift, and total GSS-1 scores were one-quarter to one-half a standard deviation 
greater in the United States sample (Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton 2012). Although these 
reflect statistically significant differences, the authors submit that this does not reflect a 
clinically significant difference in the individual scale scores due to the conservative way 
they suggest the GSS-1 be interpreted. Therefore, the authors propose that “intuitively, 
there is little reason to believe that those form the United States are any more suggestible 
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that those residing in the Great Britain or in Iceland” (p. 760-761, Frumkin, Lally, & 
Sexton, 2012). When using the GSS-1 within the United States for forensic cases, 
clinicians should consult both Gudjonsson’s (1997) sample for court referrals and 
offender groups as well as Frumkin, Lally, and Sexton’s (2012) U.S. Forensic sample for 
additional comparisons. 
While Frumkin, Lally and Sexton (2012) attest that the GSS can be used in the 
context of criminal justice evaluations within the United States for confession-related 
assessments using the proper adaptations for local nomenclature, they note that “GSS 
scores provides only one piece of information important for the forensic psychologist to 
consider when evaluating factors related to the voluntariness or validity of a confession” 
(p. 761). They suggest that additional measures should be utilized in conjunction with the 
GSS-1 to make conclusions about the interaction between the interrogative situation and 
intrapersonal factors on the veracity of a confession (Frumkin, Lally & Sexton 2012).  
Manipulating Suggestibility Scores 
The addition of the GSS-1 within a forensic evaluation for a false confession is 
essential to include when individuals are claiming that their confession was coerced in 
some way throughout a police interrogation, which is the most common setting for false 
confession elicitation (Kassin et al., 2010). While GSS-1 scores that indicate higher 
levels of Interrogative Suggestibility to leading questions and/or negative feedback would 
lend credence to an individual’s claims to have falsely confessed to a crime, it is 
important to consider that obtaining an elevated score on the GSS-1 subscales would 
similarly assist someone who may only claim to have been adversely impacted by 
interrogative pressures. It is conceivable to believe that a factually guilty individual 
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would want to appear more suggestible if doing so could lead to avoiding a trial, having 
their sentence reduced, or overall have decreased legal repercussions (Baxter & Bain, 
2002). These behaviors are commonly referred to as “faking bad” or as as a non-credible 
performance. 
Feigning symptomology is most commonly discussed in terms of malingering, 
which describes the exaggeration of symptom severity or falsifying psychiatric symptoms 
that is motivated by primary or secondary gains (Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, & Condit, 
2002). In malingering cases, a person actively exaggerates existing features of themselves 
or fabricates features entirely to appear a certain way; this is generally an intentional 
deception on the part of the individual and not a subconscious one (Ziegler & Boone, 
2013). The benefits from successful feigning vary; they could be minor, such as being 
wrongfully granted access to a disabled parking spot, or larger, such as securing VA 
health care and monetary benefits. When malingering in forensic evaluations, the stakes 
are even higher; successful feigning could lead vast sentence reduction in criminal cases, 
or even to large monetary gains in civil suits. In addition, the inherent motivation that 
individuals could experience to exaggerate symptoms in these cases, lawyers are aware of 
the tests being utilized by psychologists to measure constructs such as suggestibility, and 
may give their clients specific instructions on how to “beat” the test to better their overall 
defense (Hanson, Smeets, & Jelicic, 2010). This poses a significant risk to the integrity of 
psychological evaluations, and must be considered when conducting any forensic 
evaluation that could result in suggestions of innocence. 
To better understand a base rate for malingering and symptom exaggeration, 
Mittenberg et al. (2002) surveyed 131 neuropsychologists and asked them to identify 
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percentages of cases in which probable symptom exaggeration or malingering were 
present during their career conducting forensic cognitive evaluations. The sample 
reported on 33,531 criminal and civil cases, and estimated that malingering or 
exaggerative cognitive impairment occurs in 19-23% of criminal evaluations based 
expert’s reports of their cases. The authors note that this statistic was comparable to 
statistics obtained with previous research and “representative of those [rates] observed in 
a variety of practice settings” (Mittenberg et al., 2002; p.1097). Larrabee, Millis, and 
Meyers (2009) proposed a more conservative for the base rate of malingering of 
cognitive dysfunction in some settings to be around 40%, plus or minus 10%.   
While malingering psychiatric symptoms does not correctly encapsulate the 
behaviors seen when someone chooses to manipulate responses for constructs such as 
suggestibility, research within malingering is quite relevant when considering the 
similarities in motivation when conducting false confession psychological evaluations. If 
responding in a specific way on assessments such as the GSS-1 could lead to freedom 
from imprisonment or a decreased sentence, there is a strong motivation for a select 
population to respond in a deceptive way to reach that goal.  If researchers apply even a 
remote percentage of this base rate toward individuals being assessed for false confession 
claims, it becomes imperative to be able to differentiate between genuine and feigning 
behaviors to avoid undercutting the validity of psychological expert witness testimony. It 
is vital to be able to differentiate between those who have genuine expression of 
symptoms and those who are instructed to exaggerate or feign suggstibility. 
Validity Indicators 
For psychologists who work with latent variables such as intelligence, memory, 
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and suggestibility, it can be difficult to readily identify genuine and non-genuine 
performance. Research has begun to identify ways to detect deception using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET; Kingery & 
Schretlan, 2007) equipment that is often found in hospital settings, but this is still a 
developing field. However, even with significant findings utilizing these methods, it is 
impractical to utilize such specialized equipment in everyday psychological or forensic 
evaluations. Instead, psychologists rely on incorporating validity indicators into their 
assessment tools to ensure the person is responding to the test in a valid way. This can be 
imbedded in other assessment tools, or could be a standalone assessment to add to a 
battery. Take for example the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), a personality test 
with strong empirical support that is utilized in both clinical and forensic settings (Morey, 
2007). The author found it imperative to incorporate imbedded validity indicators to 
assess the many ways a person may be ingenuinely responding. The PAI thus had its test 
items formatted in such a way that they allow the assessor to identify a variety of test 
taking attitudes, including assessing for those who are underreporting symptomology (i.e. 
presenting themselves in a falsely positive light), those who are exaggerating 
symptomology, and assesses for those who are responding inconsistently throughout the 
tests (Morey, 2007). These questions are imbedded alongside other test items and are 
undetectable to those who are being given the test without prior knowledge of the 
questions. These indicators are used in interpreting the data such that data reported in an 
invalid way are not inaccurately interpreted as true representations of the individuals’ 
current level of functioning.  
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale and Validity Indicators. While the PAI can 
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assess test-taking attitudes and identify disingenuous responding patterns, not all 
assessment tools have the ability to add in validity indicators into the questions 
seamlessly. The GSS-1 does not contain any validity measures in its current form, and 
there currently is no consistent way to assess for those motivated to feign their level of 
suggestibility based on the GSS-1 scores alone. At present, the questions embedded 
within the GSS-1 cannot to be used as a validity indicator. Therefore, a psychologist has 
two options when attempting to measure responding patterns: either add questions to the 
GSS-1 that could impact the integrity of the original assessment, or administer the 
assessment alongside additional measures. Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson (2004) suggest 
that tests such as the GSS-1 could effectively use a separate assessment with effort 
measures to better understand responding styles when administered alongside one 
another. However, to date no study has assessed the GSS-1 alongside standalone 
measures of validity measures. 
Empirical Research Regarding Feigning Suggestibility 
 The GSS-1 contains no imbedded validity indicators to differentiate those who are 
genuinely suggestible and those who are attempting to manipulate their responses. To 
address whether this merits concern, researchers have tested hypotheses centered on the 
ability of instructed feigners to significantly manipulating GSS-1. Researchers believe 
that by comparing control groups and instructed feigner’s responses to the GSS-1 in 
experimental settings, it could be determined if the GSS-1 is susceptible to feigning 
attempts. Researchers further hypothesized that if feigning attempts were only successful 
at manipulating some subscales on the GSS-1 but not others, it might be possible to 
identify patterns that indicate ingenuine responding without the use of additional 
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assessment tools.  
Methods of Feigning Research 
Over the past 30 years, six studies have assessed whether instructed participants 
can effectively manipulate their GSS-1 scores. However, there is no consensus within the 
literature as to whether the GSS-1 is resistant to participant’s attempts to appear 
manipulate suggestibility scores. It therefore becomes necessary to explore each of these 
studies better understand the conflictual findings.   
The first study addressing this hypothesis conducted by Smith and Gudjonsson 
(1986), in which the GSS-1 with to two groups: one group was given the GSS-1 with the 
standard instructions, while the manipulation group was instructed to feign at a level 
“below their usual ability”. The instructions given to the manipulation group were 
intentionally undetailed so that the participants had the ability to respond however they 
deemed appropriate. The two groups’ scores were compared, and no significant 
differences on the Yield, Shift, or Total Suggestibility scores were seen. However, the 
instructed feigning group verbalized significantly fewer aspects of the GSS-1 narrative, 
as measured by Immediate Recall scores; no Delayed Recall responses were collected. 
The authors concluded that Immediate Recall is easy to manipulate, but that the 
remaining GSS-1 subscales are immune to feigning attempts because the true nature of 
the test is obscured from the test-taker. The authors reported that participants are unsure 
how to appropriately respond to the leading questions or negative feedback, leading to no 
consistent or successful feigning pattern.  
Baxter and Bain (2002) called into question these findings, arguing that the 
instructions given to participants in Smith and Gudjonsson (1986) were too vague to be 
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generalize to real investigations in which individuals would be given the GSS-1, such as 
criminal evaluations. Baxter and Bain (2002) attested that when being assessed in 
forensic environments, respondents are more likely to have introductory information 
about the nature of the GSS-1 or of suggestibility in general. Further, they may have an 
understanding that “their best hope of having their previous testimony discounted is now 
to appear gullible and easily pressured” (p.220, Baxter & Bain, 2002). Building upon the 
instructions that were given in the initial study, Baxter and Bain conducted their own 
study in which they provided the following script to those they placed in the “faking-bad” 
manipulation group: 
“The interviewer is going to interview you about the content of two stories you’ll 
hear. What I’d like you to do is to role-play being a suspect in a criminal 
investigation who may get off the hook if they can convince the interviewer that 
they are very gullible or very susceptible to pressure, that they are likely to accept 
whatever is said to them uncritically, and are therefore an unreliable witness. 
However, please do not go in for amateur dramatics or answer wildly. Try to 
concentrate on appearing gullible—but not stupid—by giving the interviewer 
whatever she seems to want.” (p. 221; Baxter and Bain, 2002) 
Participants in the faking group were informed of the nature of the test and encouraged to 
use this knowledge to appear genuinely suggestible. The information about what the 
person should expect within the evaluation adds to the instructions to appear ingenuine in 
their performance was a more robust way of testing this hypothesis. By adapting these 
more detailed instructions, Baxter and Bain (2002) found that the instructions were 
sufficient for participants to significantly alter GSS-1 scores compared to controls.  
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Baxter and Bain (2002) and the research that have followed have adapted more 
detailed set of instructions when presenting the GSS-1 to their instructed feigning groups, 
with varying findings. Researchers have adapted the information given to the 
manipulation group (Woolston, Bain, & Baxter, 2006; Hanson, Smeets, & Jelicic, 2010; 
Baxter, Bain, Pringle, Fowler, & Tafili, 2013), and adding comparison groups that were 
aware of the purpose of the test, but not instructed to act upon that knowledge in a 
feigning matter (Boon, Gozna, & Hall, 2008). See Appendix A for full instructions 
presented between control and manipulation groups in previous research studies cited.  
When comparing these studies, there is mixed support that, when given specific 
prompting on how to respond to the test, it would be possible to manipulate at least some 
of the subscales on the GSS-1. However, these trends deserve specific exploration to 
understand how an instructed feigner may respond to the GSS-1.  
Trends in GSS Scores 
With support that it was possible to feign on the GSS-1, it became imperative to 
determine if feigned responding increases all subscales, a select number subscales, or a 
single subscale on the GSS-1. If there are specific trends that are unusual when compared 
to expected patterns of responding on the GSS-1, those discrepancies could then be 
utilized to help inform a decision regarding feigning of suggestibility and an external 
validity measure would not be necessary. Thus, trends reported will be discussed 
regarding the findings of those instructed to feign suggestibility as measured by the GSS-
1 within the four studies, in hopes to generalize these findings to identify patterns that 
feigning responses form. The trends discussed have varying levels of empirical support, 
thus each trend will be discussed individually and then integrated as the body of literature 
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regarding feigning studies is fully explored. Of note, the studies presented did not 
consistently present the effect sizes (Cohen’s d) within their publications. Therefore, the 
authors calculated effect sizes for the individual effects using the individual study’s 
reported data and are presented alongside originally presented information 
Yield and Shift score relation.  Baxter and Bain (2002) were the first to report 
participants could manipulate GSS-1 following instruction. They found significant 
elevations in Yield 1 scores for the manipulation group that were not accompanied by an 
increase in Shift or Yield 2 scores when being compared to a control group. Baxter and 
Bain (2002) concluded that feigning attempts would increase some subscales of the GSS-
1, but that feigned suggestibility could be assessed by examining if there were 
incongruences between Yield 1 scores and Shift scores. The authors hypothesized that 
participants who were instructed to feign believed that they should initially yield to 
leading questions, but would be unaware that truly suggestible individuals would change 
their responses following negative feedback, as measured by Shift.  
Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008), and Woolston, Bain and Baxter (2006), reported 
similar results, supporting the belief that instructed feigning participants would 
demonstrate elevated Yield 1 scores without corresponding elevations in Shift and Yield 
2. However, these findings were brought into question by the results by Hanson, Smeets, 
and Jelicic (2010), who’s results suggested differences only approaching significance 
(p=.06; Cohen’s d =.62) on Yield 1. These studies together largely suggest that 
instructions to feigning could impact Yield 1 scores, but the instructions may not always 
be sufficient to elicit this response. This raises questions why some studies detected 
differences between groups, while others did not.  
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Table 2 
Yield Score Comparison  
 n F Sig. Cohen’s d 
Baxter and Bain (2002)     
 Yield 1 42 5.6 0.02 0.74 
 Yield 2 42 1.6 0.21 0.38 
Woolston, Bain and Baxter 
(2006) 
    
 Yield 1* 66 10.61 < 0.001 1.39 
 Yield 2** 66 10.44 < 0.001 1.25 
Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008)     
 Yield*** 61 30.69 < 0.001 1.80 (Yield 1) 
1.15 (Yield 2) 
Hansen, Smeets, and Jelicic 
(2010) 
    
 Yield 1**** 90 2.89 0. 06 0.62 
 Yield 2 **** 90 3.83 < 0.05 0.58 
* Post-Hoc Tukey HSD reveled significantly higher Yield 1 scores (p<0.001) in their feigning group 
compared to their control 
** Post-Hoc Tukey HSD reveled significantly higher Yield 2 scores (p<0.001) in their feigning group 
compared to their control 
***Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008) reported Yield 1 and 2 aggregate scores between groups, with Post-Hoc 
Student Newman-Keuls revealing significantly lower scores (α<0.05) when comparing their manipulation 
group to their control group; effect sizes were reported for both Yield 1 and Yield 2 
**** Post-Hoc Revealed non-significant differences between the control group and the manipulation group 
 
Table 3 
Shift Score Comparison 
 n F Sig. Cohen’s d 
Baxter and Bain (2002)     
 Shift 42 0.04 0.85 0.04 
Woolston, Bain and Baxter (2006)     
 Shift * 66 N.R. N.S./N.R. 0.20 
Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008)     
 Shift** 61 N.R. N.S./N.R. 0.40 
Hansen, Smeets, and Jelicic (2010)     
 Shift 90 1.49 0.23 0.33 
*Post-Hoc Tukey HSD reveled no significant differences in Shift (p>0.05) between their feigning group 
compared to their control 
**Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008) did not report non-significant F static findings 
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Total Suggestibility score trends. Some research suggests that Total 
Suggestibility would also be elevated following instruction. Woolston, Bain, & Baxter’s 
(2006) were the first to suggest that instructions would impact Total Suggestibility by 
virtue of the instructions elevating Yield 1, and therefore an examination of Shift scores 
would be the best indication whether the individual had true vulnerabilities. Hansen, 
Smeets, and Jelicic’s (2010) found that Total Suggestibility was the only score 
significantly impacted by feigning instructions. However, not all research supported these 
results, further highlighting the conflict between these proposed results. Baxter and Boon 
(2002) found no significant impact on Total Suggestibility scores following instruction, 
while Boon, Gozna, and Hall’s (2008) suggested impact on both Yield 1 and Shift scores, 
but not Total Suggestibility. Associated statistics are shown in Table 4.  
Table 4  
Total Suggestibility Score Comparison 
 n F Sig. Cohen’s d 
Baxter and Bain (2002)     
 Total Suggestibility 42 3.5    0.07 0.59 
Woolston, Bain and Baxter (2006)     
 Total Suggestibility * 66   6.87 <0.005 1.15 
Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008)     
 Total Suggestibility 61 17.66 <0.001 0.75 
Hansen, Smeets, and Jelicic (2010)     
 Total Suggestibility** 90 3.33 <0.05 0.65 
*Post-Hoc Tukey HSD reveled significantly higher Total Suggestibility scores (p<0.05) in their feigning 
group compared to their control 
**Post-Hoc Bonferroni analyses revealed significantly higher Total Suggestibility scores (p<0.05) in their 
feigning group compared to their control 
 
Trends regarding Free Recall scores. Smith and Gudjonsson (1986) were the 
first to indicate that there were no significant differences between their instructed 
feigning group and controls on any scale beyond Immediate Recall; their instructed 
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faking group had significantly lower recall scores as compared to the control. Smith and 
Gudjonsson (1986) argued that it was relatively easy to feign lowered recall scores, but 
that the feigning instructions were composed in a way that did not give them enough 
information about the test to adequately feign higher scores on other subscales of the 
GSS. Woolston, Bain and Baxter (2006) and Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008) conducted 
studies with more complex instructions given to the participants, and their findings 
support this trend, suggesting that this decrease in free recall within the feigning group 
was an additional factor that could be considered when attempting to identify patterns 
ingenuine responding pattern. However, both Baxter and Bain (2008) and Hansen, 
Smeets, and Jelicic (2010) found immediate recall scores were not significantly different 
impacted following instruction. Only Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008) have reported the 
pattern of depressed Delayed Recall scores following instruction, as they are currently the 
only study to have administered the GSS-1 with the time delay. See Table 5.  
Table 5 
Free Recall Score Comparison 
 n F Sig. Cohen’s d 
Baxter and Bain (2002)     
 Immediate Recall 42 1.1 0.30 0.31 
Woolston, Bain and Baxter (2006)     
 Immediate Recall * 66 5.99 <0.005 1.24 
Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008)     
Recall Aggregate** 61 6.21 <0.05 0.83 (Initial) 
    0.71 (Delayed) 
Hansen, Smeets, and Jelicic 
(2010) 
    
 Immediate Recall 90 0.33 0.71  𝜂𝑝
2=0.01*** 
*Post-Hoc Tukey HSD reveled significantly lower Immediate Recall scores (p<0.05) in their feigning 
group compared to their control 
** Recall analyses conducted together; Post-Hoc Student Newman-Keuls revealed significantly lower 
recall scores (α<0.05) 
*** As reported by authors; Authors did not provide Means and SD for Cohen’s d calculation 
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Comparison to Vulnerable Populations 
Although identifying elevated Yield 1 without corresponding Shift elevation is 
suggested by some researchers as a pattern to help identify patterns of manipulated 
response patterns, it is also important to consider the results of these studies outside of the 
experimental setting. Interestingly, the high Yield-1/low Shift trend is similar to the 
response pattern by those with genuine intellectual disabilities (Clare & Gudjonsson, 
1993), raising the concern of how the findings of an instructed feigner would be 
interpreted if gathered in a real investigation.  
Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008) were the first to examine for differences in patterns 
of feigning-instructed participant’s GSS-1 scores as compared to a genuinely vulnerable 
sample. Their results were surprising in that only the Immediate and Delayed Free Recall 
scores of their instructed feigning group were significantly different than published 
vulnerable/intellectually disabled individual norms, with their “Faking Bad” group 
participants having significantly higher recall scores; all other subscales were not 
significantly different. This is striking because it suggests that that not only could 
individuals adequately feign suggestibility, it was possible to do so in a pattern that was 
very similar to those with genuine disabilities. See Table 6.  
These findings were challenged in part by the findings of Hansen, Smeets, and 
Jelicic (2010), who conducted similar comparisons between their sample and 
intellectually disabled norms. Their findings supported that instructed feigners obtained 
significantly higher recall scores, but significantly lower scores on the Yield 2, Shift, and 
Total Suggestibility subscales compared to truly vulnerable individuals. See Table 7. 
Interestingly, there was no significant differences on Yield 1 scores between the groups.  
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Table 6 
Comparison to Vulnerable Populations’ GSS-1 Scores, Boon, Gozna, & Hall, 2008 
  t Sig.  Differences 
Immediate Recall 12.16 <0.001 Manipulation 
Group Higher 
Delayed Recall 5.4 <0.001 Manipulation 
Group Higher 
Yield 1 1.22 N.S. None 
Yield 2 1.67 N.S. None 
Shift 0.58 N.S. None 
Total Suggestibility 0.19 N.S. None 
Compared to published norms for “Intellectually Disabled” (I.Q. scores 57-75) scores presented in 
Gudjonsson (1997) 
 
Table 7  
Comparison to Vulnerable Populations’ GSS-1 Scores, Hansen, Smeets, and Jelicic 
(2010) 
  t Sig.  Differences 
Immediate Recall >6.81 <0.01 Manipulation 
Group Higher 
Delayed Recall >6.81 <0.01 Manipulation 
Group Higher 
Yield 1 -1.87 0.07 Not Significantly 
Different 
Yield 2 >-3.70 <0.01 Manipulation 
Group Lower 
Shift >-3.70 <0.01 Manipulation 
Group Lower 
Total Suggestibility >-3.70 <0.01 Manipulation 
Group Lower 
Compared to published norms for “Intellectually Disabled” (I.Q. scores 57-75) scores presented in 
Gudjonsson (1997) 
 
The authors make conclusions similar to those made within the Smith and Gudjonsson’s 
(1986) study: participants instructed to feign do not fully grasp the concepts of the GSS-1 
and therefore they cannot effectively feign. Hansen, Smeets, and Jelicic (2010) thus 
concluded that the “GSS is relatively unaffected by attempts at faking heightened 
suggestibility” (p.227) but make no clear hypothesis why their findings differ from 
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previous findings. 
Impact of Baseline Suggestibility 
There is a variety of contrasting evidence for the trends in scores introduced 
primarily by the findings of Hansen, Smeets, and Jelicic (2010), which calls into question 
why such varied findings and interpretations were garnered from studies with very 
similar methodology. Baxter, Bain, Pringle, Fowler, and Tafili (2013) conducted a 
follow-up study to better understand the more recent conflictual findings, as the methods 
utilized by Hansen, Smeets, and Jelicic (2010) were methodologically similar to those 
utilized by Woolston, Bain, and Baxter (2006). Baxter et al. (2013) argued that the reason 
for the differences could be related to baseline interrogative suggestibility score in the 
samples used, which was not measured in either study. Baxter et al. (2013) gave 100 
undergraduate students the GSS-2, followed instructions from Woolston et al. (2006), and 
then administered the GSS-1. Baseline suggestibility was determined by GSS-2 scores, 
and participants were separated between low, medium, and high suggestibility for 
statistical analysis to understand how the instructions impacted their GSS-1 results.  
Their findings suggested that following instructions to become deceitful in their 
responses, how a person responded on the GSS-1 was moderated by their initial 
suggestibility levels. Participants who were partitioned into the low or medium 
suggestibility groups based on their GSS-2 scores were seen to have increased Yield 1 
scores significantly (ps<0.05), where the high suggestibility group scores remained 
constant. Similarly, the low suggestibility group’s Shift scores increased following 
instruction (p<0.01), where the high suggestibility group scores significantly decreased 
(p<0.01). The authors concluded that changes in GSS-1 scores following feigning 
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instructions depended on the mean scores of the baseline IS level of the instructed-
feigning group, with lower baseline suggestibility individuals being able to successfully 
increase their scores and higher baseline individuals being able to suppress some subscale 
scores.  
Summary of Findings and Literature Critique 
Thus far, this paper has discussed the six studies found in the literature directly 
assessing the ability to feign suggestibility scores as measured by the GSS-1 to further 
foster the ability to differentiate between genuine and feigning responders. General trends 
presented have suggested that lower free recall scores, as well as high Yield-1 scores 
without corresponding Shift scores, could be used as markers for identification of a 
pattern of feigning as compared to control groups. However, more recent studies call into 
question these findings, which raises questions as to how to interpret the previously held 
consensus on how scores on the GSS-1 could be impacted by a motivation to feign 
suggestibility. Although Baxter et al. (2013) suggests that the conflict in the literature 
could be impacted by differences in baseline suggestibility levels, authors have proposed 
hypotheses to explain the discrepancies within the literature. The focus of this study will 
therefore turn to the limitations in the individual studies presented, as well as explore 
some of the overall methodological limitations still unaddressed within the field of 
feigned heightened suggestibility as measured by the GSS-1 to better understand the 
conflicting results and interpretations.  
Administration Discrepancies 
As previously outlined, the GSS-1 has very specific instructions that are 
formulated in a way to elicit genuine responses. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that 
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by changing the administration format that there is also an impact on the pressures placed 
on the participant. This study argues that changing the administration of the assessment 
raises concerns about the validity of the individual findings relating to manipulating 
suggestibility scores, as well as the ability to compare the findings, as previous studies 
have not uniformly administered the GSS-1.  
Apart from Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008), all previously cited research utilizing 
the GSS-1 has foregone the 50-minute wait period between the Immediate Recall and the 
Delayed Recall in administration. After querying for Immediate Recall, these protocols 
moved directly to the questioning phase of the GSS-1. Although not explicitly addressed 
or explored in their articles, the elimination of the time delay raises two important 
questions: first, does the time delay impact the relationship between the interviewer and 
the participant? And second, does the change in protocol impact the ability to manipulate 
scores provided during the assessment? These questions require discussion in their own 
right.  
According to Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale manual (Gudjonsson, 1997), the 
50-minute wait period is an integral part of the assessment, however there are three 
situations in which it would be acceptable to forgo: first, if the GSS-1 is being 
administered to an individual with low IQ or memory impairments such that they would 
not be expected to remember a large portion of the narrative after an extended period of 
time; second, in situations where participants are unable to verbalize a significant number 
of items in situations when prompted during the immediate free recall stage; or third, in 
the interest of time (Gudjonsson, 1997). Gudjonsson discusses that for individuals with 
memory impairments or learning disabilities the time delay can result in increased of 
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confabulation during the Delayed Recall phase and further negatively impact the results 
of the true suggestibility levels. However, the previous research has utilized primarily 
undergraduate students who are presumed to be of average intelligence based on their 
academic level, and therefore the removal of the wait period in the interest of shortening 
administration time. While minimally justified in the manual to remove the time delay, it 
states that the elimination of the time delay decreases the “difficulty” of the assessment in 
accordance to the manual according to the manual (Gudjonsson, 1997). This is not 
addressed by any of the literature to date. 
Justification for shortening the administration length. Many of the feigning 
studies previously discussed cite the GSS manual (Gudjonsson 1997) as their justification 
for shortening their administration time. However, more recent studies have 
supplemented this justification with the findings presented in Smeets, Leppink, Jelicic, 
and Merckelbach (2009). Smeets et al. compared administration formats of the GSS-1 by 
comparing four different groups: a Standard GSS-1 Administration group, a No-
delay/Immediate Recall group, a No Delay/No Recall group, and a 50-minute Delay/No 
Recall group. They found that the presence or absence of the 50-minute delay did not 
significantly change the participant’s scores on Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, or Total 
Suggestibility compared to their control group. They also suggested that the removal of 
the free recall tests did not significantly impact these subscale scores, regardless of the 
delay time. For general research purposes, this increases the opportunity and utility of 
using the GSS-1; further, the authors suggest future studies should consider exploring this 
shortened administration within forensic populations to explore for significant 
differences.  
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While the findings of Smeets et al. (2009) could help shorten what is admittedly a 
lengthy administration time, they make no comment on how the adaptation of the GSS-1 
protocol could impact feigning behavior and therefore their suggestions should be 
interpreted with caution when considered in the context of the feigning studies discussed. 
There are two ways this could change in a forensic setting or within the context of an 
instructed feigning study. First, the decreased interaction time may impact the 
relationship between the interviewer and the participant being administered the GSS-1. 
Because part of this assessment hinges on the relationship formed over time between the 
interviewer and interviewee, the 50-minute wait time, in conjunction with the 
recommendation suggestions to help form a positive bond during that time, may be 
significantly undermined and impact the effectiveness of both the leading questions and 
the negative feedback.  
Second, the change in protocol does not weigh the cost of not having the free 
recall data available for analysis. While this may not appear initially as an important data 
point, it is important to consider in light of the findings of previous feigning studies that 
suggest that that the layperson’s GSS-1 scores following instructions to manipulate 
suggestibility were indistinguishable from intellectually disabled normative samples 
except for free recall data (Boon, Gozna, & Hall, 2008). Further, Hansen, Smeets, and 
Jelicic (2010) noted that their feigners scored below the normative means on all subscales 
except for free recall scores, for which they scored higher. Within these studies, the free 
recall scores are suggested to be an important indicator when assessing attempts to 
manipulate suggestibility scores, and without collecting these scores other researchers 
can only make limited conclusions regarding patterns of feigning following instruction.  
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Manipulating Cognitive Load 
Beyond the factors decreasing the believability of the GSS-1 administration and 
decreasing the data points available, there are additional implications on the cognitive 
demands that are placed upon the person when being administered a shortened version 
the GSS-1. Gudjonsson (1997) states that the shorter administration time makes the 
assessment less difficult, as there are less cognitive demands between the initial 
presentation of the narrative and the presentation of the Yield 1 questions. It can be 
argues that decreasing the difficulty of an assessment as such frees cognitive resources 
that allow for an increased ability to alter verbal behavior when administered the GSS-1. 
Drake, Lipka, Smith, & Egan (2013) addressed this question, hypothesizing that 
increasing cognitive load during the GSS-1 would impair the ability to feign higher 
suggestibility scores. They attest that because the instruction to feign is minimally 
demanding on working memory, it enables “effective comprehension and critical 
evaluation of the information in the GSS questions in light of the story” (p. 848, Drake et 
al. 2013). They believe that the instructions for the GSS-1 alone are not cognitively 
demanding enough for the test to be sufficiently difficult and therefore participants are 
able to process the information more easily and respond accordingly, which increases 
their ability to feign when responding. 
Drake et al. (2013) employed a two by two design where participants were given 
the faking instructions outlined in Hansen, Smeets, and Jelicic (2010). Additionally, half 
of the participants were given a concurrent Digit Span test to increase their cognitive load 
during the GSS-1 questioning phase to assess the impact of additional cognitive load on 
the ability to feign; this was compared to a control group similarly split. Comparisons 
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between instructed feigners and controls supported they hypothesis that Yield 1 scores 
were the only scale significantly elevated within the faking-bad conditions. However, 
when the feigning group was given a concurrent cognitive task during GSS-1 
administration, Yield 1 scores fell significantly. Although Yield 1 was still significantly 
higher than the control condition for feigners assigned to the digit span task, the authors 
argued that additional increase of cognitive load could make the assessment more 
resistant to feigning attempts. It should be noted that the researchers also chose to forgo 
the time delay as well. 
Table 8:  
Cognitive Load Comparisons 
 F Sig. d 
Faking/Concurrent Task X Faking/No 
Concurrent Task 
 
 Yield 1 28.3 (1,38) p <0.001 0.098 
Faking/No Concurrent Task X 
Genuine/No Concurrent Task 
 
 Yield 1 36.8 (1,38) p <0.001 0.152 
 Yield 2 N.R. p =0.001 0.024 
 Total Suggestibility N.R. p <0.001 0.052 
Drake et al (2013; n=80) 
Considering Drake et al.’s (2013) findings that altering the cognitive load is 
correlated with the ability to manipulate GSS-1 scores, it can be concluded that altering 
the GSS-1 administration by removing the delay and inherent distraction task could have 
a unique effect on individuals motivated to manipulate their scores. Drake et al. (2013) 
support that decreasing the cognitive load and increasing their ability to focus on the task 
at hand effectively inflates individual’s baseline ability to feign. If increasing the 
cognitive load is empirically supported, it would be logical that utilizing methods that are 
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sanctioned by the assessment would be preferable to adding superfluous tasks. The goal 
of this research should first and foremost be to recreate conditions that are most 
generalizable to scenarios where the GSS-1 would be administered so the findings 
regarding feigning trends could be applicable. Drake et al.’s (2013) methods further 
reinforces that by dispensing of the wait time in research, researchers have inadvertently 
allowed the participants more cognitive freedom to act in accordance with the feigning 
instructions. However, the ability to actively participant with the manipulation and 
participating with the manipulation is a different matter that requires exploration. 
Additional Administration Differences 
Beyond the elimination of the 50-minute wait period, the studies also varied in the 
way they collected the data from the GSS-1. Woolston et al. (2010) is markedly different 
from the other studies cited because it relied on Free Recall scores to be written out by 
participants rather than verbally stated. The authors note that their Free Recall scores 
were statistically lower than the normative means, and do not discuss the motivation for 
this change in protocol. Although verbal responses being marked by a research assistant 
as correct or incorrect at the time of the response could lead to inadequate reporting, this 
is much easier to correct by recording the verbal responses and double-checking 
participant responses later rather than forcing the participants to write responses, which 
may limit their willingness to put forth their best effort. Further, writing responses for the 
GSS-1 is less likely to be utilized when giving the GSS-1 in a forensic setting. Subtle 
differences such as this in the administration may not cause a failure in a study, but the 
more minor differences arise, the more apparent the inability to generalize results 
becomes.  
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Although seemingly inconsequential on its surface, it is imperative to highlight 
that minor changes in administration such as changing the way data is collected may have 
larger consequences on results. This is even more true when there is a significant amount 
of these minor changes, which build upon one another exponentially to made comparison 
and generalizability increasingly difficult. 
Undergraduate Sample Comparisons 
Although there is a lack of uniformity within GSS-1 protocol administration 
within the feigning literature, it is important to note that all studies have primarily utilized 
undergraduate participants for their samples. Students in all the studies have been enticed 
to participate in research studies in exchange for course credit or gift cards. Often the 
literature ignore the impact the sample or recruitment method has on their results. While 
use of undergraduate research participants is not in and of itself an issue, there are some 
limitations that should be considered when interpreting results and generalizing 
conclusions to other populations. Namely, it is important to question how likely 
undergraduate student participants conform to manipulation instruction with enough 
gusto to equate how an individual would respond on the GSS-1 in a criminal justice 
setting if they were motivated by their potential freedom.  
Baxter et al. (2013) noted that due to the population and procedure they utilized, 
the participants may have had no reason to engage in the manipulation when given 
instructions to manipulate suggestibility scores. They believed this to be a significant 
limitation in their study, and suggested that “Future work might offer all participants an 
incentive, such as a cash reward, for each false implication which they detect and accept, 
which may better assess their full capacity to detect discrepancies.” (P. 923, Baxter et al., 
53 
 
 
 
2013). While they do not discuss their suggestions to improve methods for recruiting 
participants or how to address the conformity problem, this was the first article to note 
that the motivation of the participants in the manipulation group may be a concern. 
It can be assumed that all undergraduate participants who participate for course 
credit or monetary compensation may be impacted by this limitation. Although the 
feigning instructions utilized in the previous literature may be similar to instructions that 
could be given to someone in a criminal investigation hoping to feign suggestibility, the 
motivation to follow these instructions are vastly different. Students may find it difficult 
to subsume the internal motivation inherently experienced by someone who may have 
criminal responsibility negated if they respond in a certain way on these assessments. To 
date, none of the studies directly addressed this lack of motivation, and have relied on 
only the initial motivation to participate in the study as sufficient motivation to conform 
to the group conditions.  
Intelligence 
In addition to motivation levels, considerations must be made regarding 
intellectual differences between the undergraduate sample and the forensic population in 
which the GSS would likely be used. Gudjonsson and Clark (1986) suggests that 
intelligence does not have an impact on suggestibility when the participant’s IQ scores 
are within the average and above average range. This limits the expected impact that 
undergraduate participant’s intelligence would have on suggestibility scores for within-
group analyses, but dampers generalizability of findings to forensic populations. Given 
that that the average IQ within the criminal justice system is lower than that within the 
general population, this is an important consideration when attempting to generalize 
54 
 
 
 
findings. 
Beail (2002) argued that the GSS does not properly account for intellectual 
disabilities within its methodology due to its reliance on memory, which the literature 
suggests is negatively correlated with suggestibility. Beail stated that memory plays a 
large role when administering the GSS-1 with the 50-minute delay because participants 
with intellectual disabilities have difficulty remembering the narrative presented, and will 
thus answer leading questions in an acquiescent manner. To better understand the 
difficulty posed by low intelligence, Sondenaa, Rasmussen, Palmstierna, and Nottestad, 
(2010) conducted a study to assess if the GSS-1 could be used with inmates in a 
Norwegian prison. Rates of intellectual disabilities were unknown, and the participants 
(n=133) were given the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 
1999) and the GSS-1. The authors assessed the correlation between GSS-1 scores with 
IQ, finding that Full Scale IQ and GSS-1 scores were significantly negatively correlated 
for all GSS-1 subscale except Immediate recall, which had a strong positive correlation 
with Full Scale IQ (see Table 8). Further, the authors identified one in ten inmates had 
Intelligence Quotient (IQ) scores less than 70, indicating an intellectual disability. Their 
sample then was divided based on Full Scale IQ scores above and below 70 and 
compared, revealing significantly lower GSS-1 Total Suggestibility Scores s for the 
participants with IQ less than 70.  
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Table 9:  
Correlation of WASI IQ with GSS and GCS  
 WASI Full Scale 
IQ 
WASI Verbal IQ WASI 
Performance IQ 
GSS (n=113)    
 Immediate Recall 0.544 0.540 0.411 
 Yield 1 -0.263 -0.229 -0.223 
 Yield 2 -0.259 -0.237 -0.216 
 Shift -0.257 -0.237 -0.233 
 Total Suggestibility -0.321 -0.281 -0.281 
Sondenaa, Rasmussen, Palmstierna, & Nottestad, 2010; All correlations are significant (p < 0.05) 
Sondenaa et al (2010) conclude that intelligence had a significant impact on 
suggestibility scores as measured by the GSS-1, and suggest further research should 
explore use of GSS-1 in forensic populations with respect to individuals with intellectual 
disabilities. Practitioners have acknowledged the impact that cognitive deficits could 
have on GSS-1 responses and have included intelligence assessments to ensure the GSS-1 
is administered to appropriate populations (Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 2012). Due to the 
reliance on undergraduate students as the primary source of participants, there has been 
limited opportunity to assess how participants with varied intelligence quotients would 
respond to instructions to feign heightened suggestibility levels. As feigning research 
expands to include samples outside of the undergraduate population, intelligence 
assessments should be increasingly evaluated in conjunction within the GSS-1. 
Additional Assessment of Valid Responding Pattern 
The current feigning literature has focused on identifying patterns that could 
suggest feigned suggestibility on the GSS-1 by comparing instructed malingerers to 
control groups using only GSS-1 scores, which is imperative because the assessment does 
not contain inherent validity indicators. It is interesting to note that no study has 
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connected the GSS with other assessment tools, and there is no mention if its use with 
validated malingering measurements. This further demonstrates the divide between the 
experimental and practical applications, as the GSS-1 is not traditionally given in 
isolation. Frumkin, Lally, and Sexton (2012) state that the GSS-1 should be used with 
other assessments, as well as within a clinical interview to better evaluate the totality of 
the circumstances regarding the defendant and the validity of a confession. This 
decreases the reliance on a single assessment and gives a clearer clinical picture when 
formulating a clinical report. 
In real-world evaluations, is not likely that the GSS-1 would be the only 
assessment an evaluator would administer, as personality, intelligence, and behavioral 
assessments could also glean beneficial data when completing a psychological 
evaluation. If a person is inclined to feign suggestibility during a more comprehensive 
evaluation, they would likely respond to a variety of the assessments in a consistent 
manner. As previously discussed, Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson (2004) suggest the GSS-1 
could use a separate validity indicator to understand the manner in which the individual 
approached the test. Taken together, it is surprising to note that no research thus far has 
raised this point or studied the GSS-1 in the context of other assessment tools. This is a 
large area that has yet to be explored, and if Baxter et al. (2013) findings are taken to be 
true then it could be possible that only looking at the GSS-1 responses could be too 
narrow to assess attempts to feign heightened suggestibility levels.  
In conclusion, research focusing on instructed feigning requires a more in-depth 
protocol to increase the similarities to data points that would be collected in the normal 
course of a forensic evaluation that utilized the GSS-1.  
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Purpose of the Study 
In an effort to bolster the empirical support for the GSS-1 and to continue to submit 
psychological testimony, further research is necessary to understand responding patterns 
when a participant intends to distort their verbal behavior on the GSS-1. The purpose of 
the current study is to evaluate participant’s ability to manipulate their suggestibility 
scores as measured by the GSS-1, as well as to explore assessment tools that could help 
the psychologist delineate genuine and ingenuine reporting. The current study adds to the 
field by addressing multiple areas of concern addressed within the literature; first, by 
increasing the participant’s motivation to follow feigning instructions by increasing 
incentives to reward “successful” feigning of suggestibility. This intends to foster higher 
motivational levels in the participants utilized that more realistically mimics those 
experienced by individuals within a forensic psychological evaluation as compared to the 
current samples utilized within the literature, and allows for more generalizable results.  
Second, the current study will include the time delay within the GSS-1, during which 
participants will be given similar distractor tasks that they could come to expect were 
they given the GSS-1 during a forensic evaluation supporting a false confession claim. 
Third, the tasks administered alongside the GSS-1 will be analyzed. Previous research 
has not attempted to analyze GSS-1 scores in relation to additional psychological 
measures, which does not accurately reflect the practical way in which the GSS-1 would 
be administered. For this study, the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI) will be 
administered, which includes multiple clinical and validity scales that would be useful to 
forensic psychologists attempting to formulate a clinical opinion. This could potentially 
be beneficial in understanding response patterns by assessing the impact of feigning 
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instruction on validity scales embedded in the PAI and similar tests administered in an 
assessment battery.  
Next, with these adaptations in mind, the current GSS-1 findings will be compared to 
the means presented by Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008) due to their study being the first to 
report the inclusion of the 50-minute wait period when assessing the ability to manipulate 
GSS-1 scores. Further, the means from the current study will be compared to 
Gudjonsson’s normative sample (1997), Gudjonsson’s intellectual disability sample 
(1997), as well as Frumkin, Lally, and Sexton’s US forensic sample (2012) to understand 
what changes, if any, are able to be identified. These comparisons, as well as limitation in 
their comparisons, will be discussed. 
Finally, by administering an additional memory malingering assessment, it is 
hypothesized that comparisons between participants’ suggestibility scores and 
performance efforts could be made. Information from between group comparisons could 
provide valuable insight into how the instructions to feign heightened suggestibility are 
interpreted and their subsequent impact on responding patterns outside of the GSS-1. 
Additionally, information from this comparison could be used to further inform 
suggestions for assessments to consider when administering forensic batteries in the 
future in false confession cases.  
Research Hypotheses 
 The present research aims to investigate the ability of the GSS-1 to differentiate 
between individuals approaching the test in a valid manner and those who are motivated 
to feign increased suggestibility. After a thorough literature review, the following 
hypothesis were derived: 
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Hypothesis 1: Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale Score Differences 
It is predicted that there would be a significant difference in Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scale (GSS-1) scores between the control group and the manipulation 
group. Based on previous research, specific hypotheses were made based on the 
individual subscale scores within the GSS-1: 
Hypothesis 1.1. It is predicted that the GSS-1 Free Recall-Immediate scores for 
the manipulation group will be significantly lower than the control group Free Recall-
Immediate scores. 
Hypothesis 1.2. It is predicted that the GSS-1 Free Recall-Delayed scores for the 
manipulation group will be significantly lower than the control group Free Recall-
Delayed scores. 
Hypothesis 1.3. It is predicted that the GSS-1 Yield 1 scores for the manipulation 
group will be significantly lower than the control group Yield 1 scores. 
Hypothesis 1.4. It is predicted that the GSS-1 Yield 2 scores for the manipulation 
group will not significantly differ between groups. 
Hypothesis 1.5. It is predicted that the GSS-1 Shift scores will not significantly 
differ between groups.  
Hypothesis 1.6. It is predicted that the GSS-1 Total Suggestibility scores for the 
manipulation group will be significantly higher than the control group Total 
Suggestibility scores. 
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Hypothesis 2: Personality Assessment Inventory Validity Scale Differences 
It is predicted that there would be a significant difference in Personality 
Assessment Inventory (PAI) Validity Scale scores between the control group and the 
manipulation group. Specific hypotheses were made based on the individual Validity 
Scales within the PAI: 
Hypothesis 2.1. It is predicted that the PAI Inconsistency Scale (ICN) scores for 
the manipulation group will be significantly higher than the control group. 
Hypothesis 2.2. It is predicted that the PAI Infrequency Scale (INF) scores for the 
manipulation group will be significantly higher than the control group. 
Hypothesis 2.3. It is predicted that the PAI Negative Impression Management 
Scale (NIM) scores for the manipulation group will be significantly higher than the 
control group. 
Hypothesis 2.4. It is predicted that the PAI Positive Impression Management 
Scale (PIM) scores for the manipulation group will be significantly higher than the 
control group. 
Hypothesis 3: Test of Memory Malingering Scale Differences 
It is predicted that there would be a significant difference in Test of Memory 
Malingering (TOMM) scores between the control group and the manipulation group. 
Specific hypotheses were made based on the individual TOMM Scales: 
Hypothesis 3.1. It is predicted that the TOMM Trial 1 scores for the manipulation 
group will be significantly lower than the control group TOMM Trial 1 scores. 
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Hypothesis 3.2. It is predicted that the Trial 2 scores for the manipulation group 
will be significantly lower than the control group TOMM Trial 2 scores. 
Hypothesis 3.3. It is predicted that the TOMM Retention Trial scores for the 
manipulation group will be significantly lower than the control group TOMM Retention 
Trial scores. 
Hypothesis 4: Gudjonsson Compliance Scale Score Differences 
It is predicted that the Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS) scores for the 
manipulation group will be significantly higher than the control group GCS scores. 
Exploratory Analysis: Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale Mean Comparisons 
GSS-1 scores collected will be compared to four different samples to understand 
how representative they are of the current literature base’s assertion. The first comparison 
will be between current findings and those presented by Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008); 
this will help understand the impact of the increased incentive and specified distractor 
task for the manipulation group. It is predicted that the manipulation group GSS-1 scores 
will not significantly differ from mean response scores on Immediate Free Recall, Yield 
1, Yield 2, Shift, Total Suggestibility those seen in the “Faking Bad” group from Boon, 
Gozna, and Hall (2008). Second, the means for the control group will be compared to 
mean scores presented by Gudjonsson (1997) for their normative sample to assess for 
differences in US and UK samples in line with those suggested by Frumkin, Lally, & 
Sexton (2012). Third, in line with previous research, the means for the manipulation 
group will be compared to mean scores presented by Gudjonsson (1997) for their 
intellectually disabled sample to assess whether instructed feigner’s scores significantly 
differ on any GSS-1 subscales. Finally, a comparison to Frumkin, Lally, and Sexton’s 
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(2012) proposed U.S. forensic population will be conducted. These explorations intend to 
further understand the implications of the current study’s findings in the context of the 
current literature.  
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CHAPTER III 
Methodology 
Participants 
 The sample for the current study consisted of 32 undergraduate students recruited 
through flyers posted throughout a local college campus. Participants were offered a $20 
gift card as an incentive for participating in the study. Researchers excluded potential 
participants who were under the age of 18, as well as any individuals that could not read 
and write in English fluently. Participant age ranged from 18-30 (M = 20.06, SD = 2.21). 
Eight participants were male, and twenty-four participants were female. Participants 
identified their race/ethnicity as followed: Black, 39.4%, (n=13); Caucasian, 24.2% 
(n=8); Hispanic, 18.2% (n=6), Asian, 15.2% (n=5), and 12.5% (n=4) participants 
identified their race as Mixed. No participants failed to complete the study once they 
consented to participate. 
Protection of Human Participants 
The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Nova 
Southeastern University. This study was determined to have minimal risk to the 
participants and all participants were given an informed consent form prior to testing. 
Due to the use of deception within the study embedded within the Gudjonsson 
Suggestibility Scale, all participants were debriefed regarding the use of deception and 
given the opportunity to remove their data if they wished without losing any recruitment 
incentive. No participant chose to withdraw their data from the study when given this 
opportunity. This debriefing also included providing participants with the contact 
information for both the research team and student counseling if they had further 
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questions regarding the study or if they wanted to discuss thoughts or emotions brought 
about through their participation.  
Measures 
 Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale-1 (GSS-1). The Gudjonsson Suggestibility 
Scale (Gudjonsson, 1997) is an assessment tool which assists in measuring an 
individual’s susceptibility to interrogative pressures during a simulated investigative 
interview. The assessment is presented as a memory test by the evaluator to disguise the 
nature of the assessment, which includes asking the participant questions about their 
subjective accounts of their memory. The participants are then presented a narrative of a 
factitious robbery. Immediately following hearing the narrative, participants are asked to 
recall everything they are able. Participants are then presented an unrelated distractor task 
that lasted up to fifty minutes, after which they are asked to recall everything they can 
regarding the narrative once again. Participant are then asked twenty questions regarding 
the content of the narrative; of these questions, fifteen questions are considered leading 
questions, as they ask about information that is not present in the narrative and are 
presented in ways in which convey an expected answer. Regardless of how the 
participants respond, after responding to all of the questions they are told that the 
following verbatim: "You have made a number of errors. It is therefore necessary to go 
through the questions once more, and this time try to be more accurate." Participant are 
asked the same twenty questions again. All responses are suggested to be recorded using 
audio-tape for a secondary check of scoring. Scoring of the GSS-1 is “nondiscretionary” 
(Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 2012), and was completed following the instructions outlined 
in the administration manual (Gudjonsson, 1997).  
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 The GSS-1 Manual (Gudjonsson, 1997) has collected normative date for a variety 
of populations from the United Kingdom, including for adults in the general population 
(see Table 10), adult and juvenile criminal offenders, and adults with intellectual 
disabilities (see Table 11). To assess test-retest reliability, Gudjonsson (1987) compared \ 
scores obtained on the GSS-1 and the GSS-2, an alternative form that follows the same 
administrative format of the GSS-1 but changes the narrative presented to the participant 
and adjusts the questions accordingly. He found that test-retest correlations on the scales 
ranged from 0.73-0.90 for individuals within a general population (n=28; see Table 12). 
While no current normative sample exists from the United Stated, Frumkin (2008) 
suggests that conservative interpretation of the scores as compared to the UK norms is 
appropriate. 
Table 10  
GSS Normative Sample, Gudjonsson (1997) 
 N Mean S.D. Range 
Immediate Recall 157 21.3 7.1 4-36 
Delayed Recall 135 19.5 7.5 4-34.5 
Yield 1 157 4.6 3.0 0-13 
Yield 2 157 5.6 3.8 0-15 
Shift 157 2.9 2.5 0-12 
Total Suggestibility 157 7.5 4.6 0-21 
 
Table 11  
GSS Norms for Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities, Gudjonsson (1997) 
 N Mean S.D. Range 
Immediate Recall 68 8.1 4.9 0-24 
Delayed Recall 68 6.0 4.9 0-23.5 
Yield 1 68 9.8 3.5 0-15 
Yield 2 68 9.4 3.5 0-15 
Shift 68 4.8 3.0 0-13 
Total Suggestibility 68 14.6 4.6 0-24 
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Table 12 
GSS Test-Retest Correlation, Gudjonsson (1987) 
Immediate 
Recall 
Delayed 
Recall 
Yield 1 Yield 2 Shift Total 
Suggestibility 
0.77 0.73 0.84 0.86 0.79 0.90 
 
Test of Memory Malingering. The Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; 
Tombaugh, 1996) is a 50-item forced-choice recognition assessment that aims to 
differentiate individuals with genuine memory disturbances and those who are feigning 
memory impairment. Subjects are informed they are being assessed on their ability to 
learn and remember pictures of common objects. Participants are shown 50 items, seeing 
each item for three second. During the subsequent two trials, the subject is shown 50 
pages, each of which contains one previously seen item and a new picture. Participants 
are instructed to identify the item they have previously seen. Between Administration 1 
and 2, the participant is given a second learning trial of the initial items. Following the 
second trial, a retention trial can be administered. This retention trial is administered after 
a 15 minute wait period, and does not include a learning trial. When administering the 
TOMM, both positive and negative feedback is given by the researcher following each 
response.  
 The TOMM utilizes a high number of visual stimuli that make the assessment 
appear more difficult than it truly is, and therefore participants who are attempting to 
perform poorly within a battery of tests may modify their responses on the TOMM 
(Tombaugh, 1996). In addition, implementing feedback for correct and incorrect 
responses increases performance for genuine-performing participants.  The TOMM 
(Tombaugh, 1997). was validated on a sample of 158 participants which included 
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participants from a Veterans Administration Medical Center and participants who had 
head-injuries who had participated in previous research. Participants were divided into 
five groups: No Cognitive Impairment (n=13), Cognitive Impairment (n=42), Aphasia 
(n=21), Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI; n=45), or Dementia group (n=37). Results 
indicated that the Dementia group scored significantly lower than the other groups on 
Trial 1, Trial 2, and on the Retention Trial. Tombaugh (1997) concluded that a cutoff 
score of 45 could correctly identify the majority of participants as not malingering (95% 
correct classification rate), with decreased discernibility for only the Dementia group 
(91%). Similar comparisons have utilized the 45 cutoffs with results indicating 100% 
specificity and as high as 93% sensitivity rating (Tombaugh, 1997). Therefore, scoring 
less than 45 on trial 2 or the retention trial “raise[s] concern that the individual is not 
putting forth maximum effort and is likely malingering” (p.2, Tombaugh, 1996). 
Evaluations of internal consistency of the TOMM has found high coefficient alpha (.94-
.95; Spreen & Strauss, 1998).  
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI). The Personality Assessment Inventory 
(PAI) is a 344-item self-report inventory that was developed to adult psychopathology 
(Morey, 2007). The PAI consists of 22 scales, including four validity scales, eleven 
clinical scales, five treatment scales, and two interpersonal scales (Morey, 2007). The 
PAI is used to aide in screening, diagnosing, and planning treatment for 
psychopathology. The PAI has advantages over similar personality measures such as a 
low reading level required for administration (4th grade reading level), scaled responses 
compared to force-choice responses, and fewer overall test questions. Item response 
utilizes a four-point Likert-Scale: False, Slightly True, Mainly True, and Very True 
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(Morey, 2007). Responses are analyzed and each scale is reported as a t-scores that range 
from 20-110; mean scores fall between a t- Score of 50 and 70, with scores outside of that 
range indicating significant differences (Morey, 2007). Reported good internal 
consistency for college samples, α ranges .66 to .94, with an internal consistency of .82 
for college samples; test retest reliability ranges from .60-.94 (Morey, 2007).  
Of significant importance to the current research are the validity scales embedded 
into the PAI questions, which evaluate reporting styles to ensure an interpretable report. 
The Inconsistency Scale (ICN) consists of ten paired items that are highly correlated to 
assess consistent responding throughout the assessment, whereas the Infrequency (INF) 
scale utilizes eight questions that assesses for careless responding. Negative Impression 
Management (NIM) focuses on identifying exaggerated endorsement of symptoms, 
whereas the Positive Impression Management (PIM) assesses for responding to show 
oneself in an overly favorable light. These scales can be utilized to either invalidate PAI 
scores or can be utilized to alter interpretations of clinical scale scores considering 
responding patterns (Morey, 2007).  
 Gudjonsson Compliance Scale. The Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS; 
Gudjonsson, 1989) is a twenty question self-report measure of compliance. Compliance 
differs from suggestibility in that, while suggestibility infers an internal acceptance of 
actions or statements being made as being true, compliance merely indicates that “the 
person makes a conscious decision to carry out the behavior proposed or requested, even 
if he or she privately does not agree with it” (p.5, Gudjonsson, 1997). This construct 
helps researchers distinguish between the level in which participants may simply comply 
with instructions presented rather than internalize the belief in their responses. The has 
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modest statistical support, with an alpha coefficient of 0.71. Research suggests the GCS 
loads onto three different factors: avoidance of confrontation/conflict, eagerness to 
please, and compliant behaviors (Gudjonsson, 2007). The test-retest reliability for the 
GCS is modest (r=0.88 p<0.001; Gudjonsson, 1989). The GCS mean normative scores 
for UK university students is 7.8 (S.D.= 4.1; Gudjonsson, 1989), which will be used for 
comparison for the purposes of this study. 
 Demographic Questionnaire. A brief demographics form was utilized in this 
study to collect participant’s age, gender, race/ethnicity, and educational level. See 
Appendix D for the Demographics Questionnaire presented. 
Procedure 
 This study used a between-group design. Participants were randomly assigned to 
two conditions, with each group containing sixteen participants. During the recruitment, 
all participants were informed that they would be taking multiple assessments as part of 
the research (see Appendix B for the recruitment flyer). If prompted, participants were 
told by recruiters they would spend up to two hours taking both verbal and pen-and-paper 
assessments. Participants were scheduled to meet with research assistants based on 
communal availability. Assessment administration were conducted in private rooms 
within a local public library. All research assistants were doctoral psychology candidates 
trained in clinical assessment administration. In preparation for this this study, assistants 
were familiarized with the assessment tools and observed in administration of the 
assessments prior to data collection to ensure consistent administrations of the GSS-1 
negative feedback. Additionally, administrations were reviewed to provide feedback to 
ensure consistent administration over time and research assistants. 
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When a participant first met with a research assistant, they were given an 
informed consent that was reviewed collaboratively (See Appendix C).  The consent 
informed participants that they would be taking a series of written and verbal 
psychological assessments to better understand their connection to one another. Upon 
signing the consent, participants were presented with an envelope that contained one of 
two instructions; these instructions varied by condition and established comparison 
groups. Participants in the control group received the following instructions, which has a 
Flesch-Kincaid reading level of 7.0:   
“You are going to be given multiple assessments today. Please complete the 
assessments as you normally would. You should attempt to complete the 
assessments to the best of your ability. The interviewer is unaware of the 
instructions that you have been given, so please do not let them know what you 
have read here. When you have finished reading this letter, please fold it and 
return it to the envelope.” 
Participants in the manipulation group were given a different set of instructions 
that has a Flesch-Kincaid reading level of 9.6, which read as follows:  
“You are going to be given multiple assessments today. You should attempt to 
play the role of someone who is a suspect in a criminal investigation. You have 
the chance of getting off the hook if you can convince the interviewer that you are 
easily influenced by pressure from other people. You should try to go along with 
everything the interviewer says to you, as though you accept everything that is 
said to you without question. However, please do not go in for amateur dramatics 
or answer wildly. Try to concentrate on appearing gullible—but not stupid—by 
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giving the interviewer whatever they seem to want. If you are determined to be 
the most credible faker in the research study, you will be compensated with a $50 
Publix Gift card. The interviewer is unaware of the instructions that you have 
been given, so please do not let them know what you have read here. When you 
have finished reading this letter, please fold it and return it to the envelope.” 
Research assistants were unaware of the instructions or the intent of the group 
differentiation. This was debriefed to all research assistants following completion of data 
collection. Following the presentation of the group instructions, participants were 
evaluated using the four clinical assessment tools discussed and a demographics 
questionnaire. Research assistants recorded verbal responses with an audio recorder for 
subsequent review of scoring.  
Administration began with the beginning of the GSS-1. The research assistant 
informed the participant that they were being presented with a memory test, and asked 
them to rate their memory and explain their rationale. The participants were then played a 
standardized audio recording of the GSS-1 narrative. When the recording was completed, 
participants were asked to recall as many aspects of the story as they could without 
encouragement. The GSS-1 then calls for a 50-minute wait period, thus participants were 
administered the PAI as they waited. If the participant completed the PAI before the wait 
period was competed, the GSS-1 was resumed; no participant took the full wait period to 
complete the PAI. 
When the GSS-1 was resumed, the participants were asked to again recall as 
many aspects of the narrative as they could. When the participant is unable to recall 
additional information, they were presented with 20 forced-choice questions about the 
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narrative. After the participant had answered the questions, they were told the following 
verbatim: "You have made a number of errors. It is therefore necessary to go through the 
questions once more, and this time try to be more accurate” (Gudjonsson, 1997). 
Participants were then asked the same 20 forced-choice questions. This concluded the 
GSS-1 administration. Participants were then administered the first and second trials of 
the TOMM with standard instruction. After the TOMM administration, participants were 
administered the GCS and the Demographics Questionnaire (see Appendix D). 
Following completion and submission of all assessment responses participants 
were debriefed about their participation, with emphasis on the standardized negative 
feedback regarding their accuracy when responding to the GSS-1 questions. After being 
informed this response were scripted and not related to actual responses, participants 
were informed that they could withdraw their data without penalty due to the deception 
involved. Notably, no participant elected to withdraw their data following being informed 
of the study Participants were given contact information for the lead researcher, as well 
as the counseling center contact information. Participants were then given the $20 
incentive.  
Statistical Analysis 
A series of analyses were conducted for this study to address the five main 
hypotheses. A series of One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) models was performed 
to evaluate each of the hypotheses for the effect of instruction (Control vs. Manipulation 
groups) on GSS-1 six subscale scores (Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, Total Suggestibility, 
Immediate Recall, Delayed Recall), PAI’s validity scales (Inconsistency, Infrequency, 
Negative Impression management, and Positive Impression Management scales), TOMM 
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Trial Scores (Trials 1and 2) and the GCS scores. Additional analyses were conducted 
when assumptions failed that did not allow ANOVAs to be conducted. Finally, a series of 
t-tests were completed to compare GSS scores to previous research findings. In Chapter’s 
4 and 5, the results of these analyses will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Results 
 This study was a comparison between participants instructed to feign heightened 
suggestibility levels (n = 16) and a control group (n = 16) on the following assessments: 
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS-1), Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), Test 
of Memory Malingering (TOMM), and Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS). In this 
chapter, results of a series of one-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) are presented. 
Additionally, t-tests were conducted to enlighten how these results compared to previous 
feigning research and published GSS-1 samples. Analyses were conducted utilizing SPSS 
20.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL). Given the study’s small sample size, effect size (Cohen’s 
d) was utilized to supplement decisions regarding statistical significance. Although some 
hypotheses did not reach statistical significance, interpretations of results were 
supplemented by the presence or absence of a meaningful effect size. For the current 
study, Cohen’s (1992) guidelines for effect size interpretation were utilized, defining |d| 
equal to .2 as a small effect, d equal to .5 as a medium effect, and a d equal to .8 as a 
large effect.  
Hypothesis 1 
 Hypothesis 1 aimed to understand differences group assignment would have on 
GSS-1 scores. Measures of central tendency and variability (Mean, Standard Deviation, 
and Range) are presented in Table 13. Tables 14 and 15 present results of Levene’s Test 
of Equality of Error Variances and Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality, respectively. Results 
of the series of ANOVAs conducted are presented in Table 16. Results for individual 
hypotheses are discussed below. 
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Table 13 
Central Tendency and Variability for the GSS-1 
 Control Manipulation 
 M SD Range M SD Range 
Immediate Recall 20.531 5.143 13.5-31.5 15.969 4.436 7.5-24.5 
Delayed Recall 19.781 4.764 13.0-32.0 15.094 4.083 7.0-25.5 
Yield 1 5.25 2.113 1-9 5.34 2.241 2-10 
Yield 2 6.25 2.696 2-10 7.47 2.907 3-14 
Shift 4.69 3.610 0-10 4.56 2.707 1-9 
Total Suggestibility 10.00 4.913 2-16 9.938 4.106 3-18 
 
Table 14 
Levene’s test for the GSS-1 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
Immediate Recall .866 1 30 .359 
Delayed Recall .595 1 30 .446 
Yield 1 .040 1 30 .843 
Yield 2 .023 1 30 .881 
Shift .235 1 30 .475 
Total Suggestibility .110 1 30 .642 
 
Table 15 
Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality for the GSS-1 
 Control Manipulation 
 Statistic df p Statistic df p 
Immediate Recall .951 16 .501 .982 16 .975 
Delayed Recall .917 16 .148 .925 16 .200 
Yield 1 .974 16 .898 .958 16 .633 
Yield 2 .961 16 .678 .957 16 .606 
Shift .896 16 .071 .896 16 .068 
Total Suggestibility .933 16 .268 .959 16 .652 
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Table 16  
ANOVAs Results for the GSS-1 
 df F p ηp2 Observed 
Power 
Immediate Recall 1, 30 7.220 .012 .194 .739 
Delayed Recall 1, 30 8.929 .006 .229 .824 
Yield 1 1, 30 .015 .904 .000 .052 
Yield 2 1, 30 1.512 .228 .048 .222 
Shift 1, 30 .012 .913 <.001 .051 
Total Suggestibility 1, 30 .002 .969 <.001 .050 
 
Hypothesis 1.1. This hypothesis proposed that Immediate Free Recall scores 
would be significantly lower in the Manipulation group when compared to the Control 
group. A one-way ANOVA revealed a statistically significant difference between the 
Control and Manipulation group on Immediate Free Recall (p = .012). Cohen’s effect size 
(d = .95) indicated a large practical difference between the groups, with Immediate Free 
Recall scores being significantly lower in the Manipulation group as compared to the 
control group. This finding supported the hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 1.2. This hypothesis proposed that Delayed Free Recall scores would 
be significantly lower in the Manipulation group when compared to the Control group. A 
one-way ANOVA revealed a statistically significant difference between the Control and 
Manipulation group on Delayed Free Recall scores (p = .006; d = 1.06). This indicates a 
large practical difference between the groups, with Delayed Free Recall scores being 
significantly lower in the Manipulation group as compared to the control group. This 
finding supported the hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 1.3. This hypothesis proposed that Yield 1 scores would be 
significantly lower in the Manipulation group when compared to the Control group. A 
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one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences between groups with respect to 
Yield 1 scores (p = .904). The Cohen’s d of .04 indicates no practical differences between 
the groups, which did did not support the hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 1.4. This hypothesis proposed that Yield 2 scores would not 
significantly differ between groups. A one-way ANOVA was conducted, which revealed 
no significant difference between groups with respect to Yield 2 scores (p = .228). 
Although the result was nonsignificant, the Cohen’s d of .44 suggests a moderate 
between-group difference. This finding did not support the hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 1.5. This hypothesis proposed that Shift scores would not be 
significantly differ between groups. A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant 
differences between groups with respect to Shift scores (p = .913). The Cohen’s d of .04 
indicates no practical differences between the groups, providing support for this 
hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 1.6. This hypothesis proposed that Total Suggestibility scores would 
be significantly higher in the Manipulation group when compared to the Control group. A 
one-way ANOVA revealed no significant differences between groups with respect to 
Total Suggestibility scores (p = .969). The Cohen’s d of .01 indicates no practical 
differences between the groups, which did not support the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 proposed that instructions to feign heightened suggestibility would 
significantly impact PAI validity scale scores when compared to the control group. 
Measures of central tendency and variability (Mean, Standard Deviation, and Range) are 
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presented in Table 17. Tables 18 and 19 presents results of Levene’s Test of Equality of 
Error Variances and Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality, respectively, which test assumption 
that allow for the ANOVAs to be conducted; cases in which analyses failed to meet these 
assumptions will be discussed in further detail. Results of the series of ANOVAs are 
presented in Table 20. Results for individual hypotheses are discussed below. 
Table 17  
Central Tendency and Variability for the PAI 
 Control Manipulation 
 M SD Range M SD Range 
Inconsistency 45.06 6.816 37-64 55.38 7.658 40-67 
Infrequency 52.94 6.728 44-67 60.00 19.121 40-110 
Negative Impression 
Management 
49.69 6.416 44-66 55.50 12.253 41-81 
Positive Impression 
Management 
45.69 15.217 15-66 42.13 11.598 22-66 
 
Table 18 
Levene’s test for the PAI 
 F df1 df2 Sig. 
Inconsistency .595 1 30 .446 
Infrequency 4.949 1 30 .034 
Negative Impression 
Management 
8.105 1 30 .008 
Positive Impression 
Management 
.738 1 30 .397 
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Table 19 
Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality for the PAI 
 Control Manipulation 
 Statistic df p Statistic df p 
Inconsistency .876 16 .033 .960 16 .655 
Infrequency .921 16 .177 .805 16 .003 
Negative 
Impression 
Management 
.793 16 .002 .867 16 .024 
Positive Impression 
Management 
.939 16 .341 .980 16 .965 
  
Table 20 
ANOVAs Results for the PAI 
 df F p ηp2 Observed 
Power 
Inconsistency 1, 30 16.188 .000 .350 .973 
Positive Impression 
Management 
1, 30 .555 .462 .018 .111 
 
Table 21 
Welsh’s ANOVAs Results for the PAI 
 df F p 
Infrequency 1, 18.658 1.942 .180 
Negative Impression 
Management 
1, 22.650 2.826 .107 
 
Hypothesis 2.1. This hypothesis proposed that Inconsistency (INC) scores would 
be significantly higher in the Manipulation group as compared to the Control group. The 
control group had one outlier on INC as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. This score 
was retained, as it was not a significant departure from expected response patterns on the 
PAI (t=64). The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality indicated that INC scores were not 
normally distributed for the control group (p <.05). However, a one-way ANOVA was 
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conducted to better understand the sample’s characteristics and mean differences. There 
were statistically significant differences between groups with respect to INC scores, (p = 
.000), with instructed feigners endorsing more items within the Inconsistency scale. The 
Cohen’s d of 1.42 indicates this is a large practical difference between the groups, which 
supports the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2.2. This hypothesis proposed that Infrequency scores would be 
significantly higher in the Manipulation group when compared to the Control group. The 
manipulation group had two outliers on INF as assessed by inspection of a boxplot. These 
scores were retained, as they were not significant departures from expected response 
patterns on the PAI. The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality indicated that INF scores were 
not normally distributed for the manipulation group (p > .05), while Levene’s Test of 
Equality of Error Variance indicated that the error variances for Infrequency scores were 
not homogeneous (p < .05). A Welsh’s t-test was conducted to better understand the 
sample’s characteristics and mean differences. The Welsh’s t-test results indicate that the 
group means were not statistically significantly different (p >.05; See Table 21). 
However, the Cohen’s d of .49 suggests a medium effect, with more frequent 
endorsement of items on the Infrequency scale for the manipulation group. This finding 
supports the hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 2.3. This hypothesis proposed that Negative Impression Management 
(NIM) scores would be significantly higher in the Manipulation group when compared to 
the Control group. The Shapiro-Wilk test of normality indicated that NIM scores were 
not normally distributed for both groups (p>.05). A one-way Welsh’s ANOVA was 
conducted, which revealed no statistically significantly differences on NIM scores (p 
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>.05; See Table 21). The Cohen’s d of .59 indicates a medium effect, with instructed 
feigners endorsing more items within the NIM scale than the control group. This finding 
supported the hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2.4. This hypothesis proposed that Positive Impression Management 
(PIM) scores would be significantly higher in the Manipulation group when compared to 
the Control group. A one-way ANOVA revealed no statistically significant differences 
between groups with respect to PIM scores (p = .462). However, the Cohen’s d of .26 
indicates a small effect size, with instructed feigners endorsing fewer items within the 
PIM scale than the control group. This finding did not support the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 aimed to understand differences group assignment would have on 
TOMM scale scores. Measures of central tendency and variability (Mean, Standard 
Deviation, and Range) are presented in Table 22. Due to the means being both 
statistically and practically identical across both trials, no further analyses were 
conducted. This finding did not support the hypothesis. 
Table 22 
Central Tendency and Variability for the TOMM 
 Control Manipulation 
 M SD Range M SD Range 
Trial 1 49.38 .957 47-50 49.00 1.633 44-50 
Trial 2 50.00 0 N/A 50.00 0 N/A 
 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 aimed to understand differences group instructions would have on 
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GCS scores. Control group scores (M=8.688, SD=1.740) were compared to Manipulation 
group scores (M=10.375; SD= 3.01). Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances 
(p=.088) and Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality (ps=.416 and .180) indicated the 
assumptions for ANOVA testing were met. A one-way ANOVA was conducted, which 
revealed no significant difference between groups with respect to GCS scores (F(1,30) = 
3.722, p = .062). However, the Cohen’s d of .69 indicates a medium effect, with 
instructed feigners endorsing more items on the GCS than the control group. This finding 
supports the hypothesis. 
Exploratory Analyses  
To contrast current findings with those within the literature, additional 
exploratory analyses were conducted. These compared current findings to previous 
findings regarding the ability to feign on the GSS, as well as comparisons to normative 
samples. 
Comparison to previous literature. First, the current GSS-1 subscale scores and 
GCS scores were compared to those collected within Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008) 
through a series of Independent Sample t-tests. Both control groups were compared (See 
Table 23), while the “Faking Bad” group was compared to the current study’s 
manipulation group (See Table 24). Results indicated no significant differences between 
control groups. An examination of Cohen’s effect size suggests a moderate effect size for 
Immediate and Delayed Recall (d = .64 and d = .56, respectively), with higher recall 
scores garnered within the current study. An examination of Cohen’s effect size suggests 
a small effect size for Yield 1 (d = .18), Yield 2 (d = .21), Shift (d = .31), and Total 
Suggestibility (d = .29), with lower scores within Boon, Gozna, and Hall’s study. 
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Table 23 
Independent-Sample t-test comparison to Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008) “Standard 
Procedure” group 
 “Standard” group Control Group Analysis 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-value p 
Immediate Recall 17.14 5.38 20.531 5.143 1.948 0.060 
Delayed Recall 16.86 5.6 19.781 4.764 1.712 0.096 
Yield 1 5.76 3.38 5.25 2.113 -0.562 0.578 
Yield 2 6.9 3.43 6.25 2.696 -0.645 0.523 
Shift 5.67 2.69 4.69 3.610 -0.910 0.369 
Total Suggestibility 11.43 4.92 10.00 4.913 -0.877 0.387 
 
 Table 24  
One-Sample t-test comparison to Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008) “Faking Bad” group 
 “Faking Bad” 
group 
Manipulation 
Group 
Analysis 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-value p 
Immediate Recall 12.48 5.79 15.969 4.436 2.075 0.045 
Delayed Recall 12.61 5.3 15.094 4.083 1.610 0.116 
Yield 1 10.76 2.17 5.34 2.241 -7.389 0.000 
Yield 2 10.76 2.74 7.47 2.907 -3.496 0.001 
Shift 4.45 3.52 4.56 2.707 0.107 0.915 
Total Suggestibility 14.81 4.16 9.938 4.106 -3.555 0.001 
 
When comparing manipulation groups, the current study had significantly higher 
Immediate Recall scores (d = .66), and significantly lower Yield 1 (d = 2.46), Yield 2 (d 
= 1.17), and Total Suggestibility scores (d = 1.18). There were no significant differences 
on Delayed Recall (d = .52) or Shift (d =.03) scores between manipulation groups. 
Comparison to GSS-1 Normative sample. The current GSS-1 subscale scores 
for the control group were compared to the normative sample presented in the GSS 
manual (Gudjonsson, 1997; see Table 25). Results indicate that scores did not 
significantly differ on any GSS-1 subscales. Of note, in line with previous literature 
(Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 2012), despite not being significantly different, the Total 
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Suggestibility and Shift scores for the current study’s sample were approximately one-
half the SD above the mean for the UK normative sample, as seen by their approaching 
meaningful differences. However, these differences were less apparent in the current 
analysis when examining Yield 2 scores.  
Table 25 
One-Sample t-test comparison to the normative sample for the GSS-1 (Gudjonsson, 1997) 
 Gudjonsson 
Normative sample 
Control Group Analysis 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-value p 
Immediate Recall 21.3 7.1 20.531 5.143 -.753 .463 
Delayed Recall 19.5 7.5 19.781 4.764 .236 .817 
Yield 1 4.6 3.0 5.25 2.113 1.230 .238 
Yield 2 5.6 3.8 6.25 2.696 .965 .350 
Shift 2.9 2.5 4.69 3.610 1.981 .066 
Total Suggestibility 7.5 4.6 10.00 4.913 2.036 .060 
 
Comparison to intellectually disabled sample. The current GSS-1 subscale 
scores were compared to those presented in the GSS manual (Gudjonsson, 1997) for 
participants with low IQ (IQ<75; See Table 26). Results indicate that scores vary 
significantly on all GSS-1 subscales, save for Shift scores. The current sample recalled 
significantly more aspects of the GSS-1 narrative on both Immediate and Delayed Recall. 
Further, they yielded significantly less during both Yield trials. Finally, Total 
Suggestibility scores were significantly lower in the current study’s manipulation group. 
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Table 26 
One-Sample t-test comparison to the intellectually disabled normative sample for the 
GSS-2 (Gudjonsson, 1997) 
 Intellectually 
Disabled norms 
Manipulation 
Group 
Analysis 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-value p 
Immediate Recall 8.1 4.9 15.969 4.436 7.095 <.001 
Delayed Recall 6.0 4.9 15.094 4.083 8.908 <.001 
Yield 1 9.8 3.5 5.34 2.241 -7.953 <.001 
Yield 2 9.4 3.5 7.47 2.907 -2.658 .018 
Shift 4.8 3.0 4.56 2.707 -.351 .731 
Total Suggestibility 14.6 4.6 9.938 4.106 -4.542 <.001 
 
Comparison to Frumkin, Lally, and Sexton (2012) US Forensic norms. 
Finally, both the control group (Table 27) and manipulation group (Table 28) GSS scores 
were compared to scores presented by Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton (2012) to explore how 
they compared to their U.S. forensic normative adult sample. The control group scored 
consistently lower on all GSS-1 scores, save for Shift. When comparing the US sample to 
the current study’s manipulation group, the manipulation group was noted to have 
significantly lower Total Suggestibility scores. No other subscales were significantly 
different when comparing these groups.  
Table 27 
One-Sample t-test comparison between control group means and US Forensic sample 
(Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 2012) 
 US Forensic 
Adults 
Control Group Analysis 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-value p 
Yield 1 6.4 3.2 5.25 2.113 -2.177 .046 
Yield 2 8.3 3.6 6.25 2.696 -3.042 .008 
Shift 5.8 3.9 4.69 3.610 -1.233 .237 
Total Suggestibility 12.2 5.5 10.00 4.913 -1.791 .093 
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Table 28 
One-Sample t-test comparison between manipulation group means and US Forensic 
sample (Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 2012) 
 US Forensic 
Adults 
Manipulation Group Analysis 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. t-value p 
Yield 1 6.4 3.2 5.53 2.247 -1.885 .079 
Yield 2 8.3 3.6 7.78 3.005 -1.144 .271 
Shift 5.8 3.9 5.13 3.612 -1.828 .087 
Total Suggestibility 12.2 5.5 10.750 5.066 -2.204 .044 
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CHAPTER V 
Discussion 
The current research study was conducted to inform the use of the GSS-1 in the 
context of evaluations of false confession claims, specifically whether GSS-1 scores 
could be successfully manipulated following instruction. The study aimed to clarify what 
factors, if any, should be considered when trying to differentiate between genuine and 
ingenuine responders using only the data within the GSS-1. The second purpose of the 
study was to determine if manipulation instructions impacted additional assessments tools 
that could independently differentiate the groups. Given that the GSS-1 is a unique 
assessment tool that could be used to support false confession claims, empirical support is 
necessary to differentiate valid and invalid responders to bolster scientific reliability and 
utility.  
Interpretation of Hypothesis 1: Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale Findings 
 It was hypothesized that participants in the manipulation condition would 
suppress free recall scores and would yield more freely to leading questions. Based on 
previous research (Boon, Gozna, & Hall, 2008; Woolston, Bain & Baxter, 2006), it was 
proposed that there would be significant differences between groups with respect to 
Immediate Recall, Delayed Recall, Yield 1, and Total Suggestibility scores following 
instruction to feign on the GSS-1. Concurrently, it was proposed that Yield 2 and Shift 
scores would not be significantly impacted due the absence of shifting responses 
following the negative feedback phase within the GSS-1.  
The findings of the current study indicate that both the initial and delayed free 
recall scores were successfully suppressed following instruction. However, participants 
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were not able to successfully manipulate any other GSS-1 subscales. This raises 
interesting questions regarding the impact of the feigning instructions on the other 
domains of the GSS-1.  
Free Recall Scores. Beginning with Smith and Gudjonsson’s 1986 study, Free 
Recall scores have consistently been cited as being the most susceptible to manipulation 
efforts following instruction. This finding was almost unanimous within the feigning 
literature for Initial Recall scores, save for the findings of Boon and Baxter (2002). The 
current findings support that instructed feigners can successfully suppress their Initial 
Recall scores. Only Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008) included a time delay when 
administering the GSS-1, which prevented conclusions to be drawn regarding the impact 
of instruction on Delayed Recall scores. Findings of this study, in conjunction with Boon, 
Gozna, and Hall (2008), further support that participants can consistently suppress the 
number of aspects of the GSS-1 narrative they verbalize during both recall phases when 
compared to control groups.  
Despite this ability to suppress free recall scores, the current instructions utilized 
efforts were not sufficient to mimic recall rates exhibited by the intellectually disabled 
normative sample presented by Gudjonsson (1997). Manipulation group participants 
verbalized significantly more aspects of the narrative than a truly vulnerable group on 
both Immediate and Delayed Recall scores, suggesting that the methods in which 
participants chose to manipulate their verbal behavior were not sufficient to adequately 
mimic patterns exhibited by truly vulnerable individuals. In line with previous 
interpretations, participants likely were unable to accurately conceptualize how a truly 
vulnerable individual may respond to the GSS-1 during free recall queries, and when 
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weighing the request to maintain believability in their responses chose to only moderately 
suppress their free recall verbalizations.  
Therefore, in the context of a forensic evaluation, the presence of both free recall 
scores could help further the interpretive process when comparing scores to the 
appropriate normative sample. However, these recall scores must be interpreted 
considering the GSS-1 primary scales to best understand these results of the present 
study. 
GSS-1 Primary Scales. Contrary to initial hypotheses, manipulation group 
participants were not able to successfully manipulate their responses to score 
significantly higher on any of the remaining GSS-1 subscales. Further, although literature 
suggested that the manipulation group scores would not significantly differ from the truly 
vulnerable group, the current study’s manipulation group had significantly lower 
suggestibility scores on all GSS-1 primary subscales when compared to truly vulnerable 
individuals, save for Shift scores. Interpretations of GSS-1 data from a participant within 
the current study’s manipulation group within the US criminal justice system would 
suggest the individual would not be particularly vulnerable to interrogative pressures, 
with significantly lower Total Suggestibility scores limiting more favorable 
interpretations. Thus, the efforts to feign by the current study’s manipulation are 
considered unsuccessful.  
The findings of the current study indicate that even when participants are taking 
efforts to appear vulnerable, they cannot successfully differentiate themselves from a 
control group or accurately replicate the response patterns of truly vulnerable individuals 
when administered the GSS-1. These findings support those presented in Hanson, 
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Smeets, and Jelicic’s 2010 study, which was the first to suggest that the GSS-1 “is 
relatively unaffected by attempts at faking heightened suggestibility” (p. 227). Initial 
interpretations of the findings would support these claims. However, these results are 
surprising in the larger context of the literature base and are particularly interesting given 
the additional incentive given to the participants within the manipulation group to appear 
more suggestible, as well as the inclusion of the time delay.  
Comparison to Previous Literature 
Given that the findings related to the primary subscales (e.g. Yield 1, Yield 2, 
Shift, and Total Suggestibility) of the GSS-1 differ from the findings of Baxter and Bain 
(2002), Woolston, Bain and Baxter (2006), and Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008), it 
becomes important to delineate why the current findings, which support those presented 
in Hanson, Smeets, & Jelicic’s (2010) study, more accurately reflect the patterns in which 
participants respond to feigning instructions. By examining the differences in the 
methodology and samples within the study, this study aims to make light of the 
conflictual information presented.  
The current study’s means were compared to normative samples to assess whether 
there were confounds relating to the participants recruited. Control group GSS-1 scores 
from the current study were not statistically different from the normative sample 
presented in the GSS-1 Manual (Gudjonsson, 1997), or from the control group from 
Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008). Based on these analyses, it is unlikely that the findings in 
the current study’s findings were related to sampling errors.  
Thus, differences in findings must relate to the manipulation group, namely their 
response to the instructions and response to the procedures of the study. It could be 
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hypothesized that the manipulation group chose to ignore the manipulation instructions 
presented, or simply did not engage with the instructions. However, the significant 
decrease in Initial Free Recall scores compared to the control group suggests that this is 
not the case. Further, the significant difference on the Delayed Recall scores indicate that 
the participants were aware of, and attempting to engage with, their manipulation both 
before and after the time delay. It can be concluded that, at least to some degree, the 
participants within the manipulation group were engaged with their manipulation during 
the majority of the administration time.  
The current study’s manipulation group had significantly higher Immediate Recall 
scores, while scoring significantly lower on Yield 1, Yield 2, and Total Suggestibility 
compared to Boon, Gozna, and Hall’s (2008) “Faking Bad” group. It is important to 
consider that the instructions given to the groups were quite similar, specifically in 
wording regarding appearing gullible without appearing as if they were acting or 
dramatizing their responses. One of the main differences in the instructions was the 
addition of the incentive given to participants in the current study to engage in the 
manipulation as suggested by Baxter et al. (2013).  
Proposed Interpretations. There are two factors that may have accounted for 
such significant differences on primary scales of the GSS-1 between the current study 
and that presented in Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008). The first was the implementation of 
the PAI during the delay between the Initial and Delayed Recall phases. Boon, Gozna, 
and Hall (2008) did not note how they had their participants utilized this time, while 
participants within the current study were presented with 344 questions of the PAI in 
which they had to complete. It could be that, in line with the findings of Baxter et al. 
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(2013), that the added cognitive load associated with responding to the PAI would have 
decreased resources available to manipulate responses during the Yield 1 questioning 
phase. In all previous studies, the participants were presented the feigning instructions, 
the GSS-1 narrative, and the Yield 1 questions in quick succession. Their findings would 
indicate that when this procedure is followed, participants may be more cognitively 
prepared to manipulate their scores. However, within the current study the delay and the 
associated cognitive demands depleted these resources. The current findings suggest that 
the GSS-1 has a built-in opportunity to increase the cognitive load and thus the defense 
against feigning efforts by using the 50-minute delay for additional assessment tools such 
as personality assessments.  
A second factor that could have accounted for the differences between the current 
findings and the previous literature could relate to the inclusion of the extra incentive 
suggested by Baxter et al. (2013) to foster additional adherence to the manipulation 
instructions. One hypothesis proposed is that this addition may have had a paradoxical 
impact on responding patterns on the primary subscales on the GSS-1, such that the added 
attention to the desire to feign led to suppressed feigning efforts as see in the high 
Interrogative Suggestibility (IS) group in Baxter et al.’s (2013) study. Baxter et al. 
suggested that the baseline IS level impacted how an undergraduate participant responded 
to instructions to feign; participants with mild to moderate IS levels were successful in 
increasing their suggestibility scores, while High IS participants paradoxically garnered 
lower scores following instruction. The authors interpreted these results to indicate that 
that the high IS group, while “more trusting and value trust, may be uncomfortable with 
the deception and the invitation to be party to it” (p.921), which led to them become less 
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trusting within the confines of the study and subsequently lower IS scores. When applying 
these interpretations to the current study, the addition of the added incentive may have 
generalized the discomfort experienced by the high IS group to all participants, which led 
to a decrease in Yield 1, Yield 2, and Shift responses.  
It should be noted that if this were the main factor influencing this change, the 
results suggesting that the GSS-1 is resistant to feigning efforts would not be generalizable 
to the forensic setting because, as Baxter et al. (2013) writes, “people who come to the test 
with established deceptive intent will not be affected [by the introduction of deceptive 
intent] in this way” (p. 922-923). While this could play a factor in the differences between 
the studies, the secondary hypotheses, and the assessments included to test them, may be a 
more important influencing factor to consider.  
Hypotheses 2-4: Personality Assessment Inventory, Gudjonsson Compliance Scale, 
and Test of Memory Malingering Findings 
  The current study was the first to include additional assessments administered 
alongside the GSS-1, which both helped replicate the data available when administering a 
forensic battery for false confession cases and allowed for the time delay within the GSS-
1 to be included without the inclusion of inconsequential distractor tasks. It was believed 
that the PAI, GCS, and TOMM could help differentiate between the control group and 
instructed feigners. Secondarily, responses were anticipated to shed light on how 
participants chose to engage with the manipulation instructions. The only significant 
differences between groups that were identified on the PAI were on the Inconsistency 
scale; participants within the manipulation group responded more inconsistently to 
questions throughout the PAI. Infrequency, Positive Impression Management, and 
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Negative Impression management were not significantly different between groups. No 
significant differences were found between group’s GCS or TOMM scores. 
 However, the current study’s sample size may have negatively impacted the 
ability to detect group differences and therefore effect sizes were examined. The results 
suggest large practical differences on the Inconsistency scale, medium practical 
differences on the Infrequency and Negative Impression Management (NIM) scales, and 
a small practical effect on the Positive Impression Management (PIM) scale. Save for 
PIM scores, the feigning groups all responded in the expected direction as compared to 
the control group. This suggests a pattern of increased responding of uncommon 
symptomology, and a decrease in desire to present themselves in a positive light. Of note, 
almost none of these instructed feigning responders elevated any validly scale scores to a 
degree that would invalidate the test. In examination of the individual scores, only one 
participant within the feigning group responded in such a way that could invalidate their 
PAI profile (INF=110; Morey, 2007).  
It becomes important to consider whether participants were engaging with their 
manipulation during the PAI. As discussed, the suppression of the Initial and Delay 
Recall scores within the manipulation group suggest that both before and following the 
completion of the PAI participants were engaging with their manipulation. Then the 
question becomes did the participants ignore their instructions while completing the PAI, 
or were these insufficient to adequately impact how participants responded to the PAI 
stimuli. When examining the verbiage utilized within the instructions, the participants 
were told to apply the instruction to “multiple assessments,” but the focus was on 
responding in conjunction with the interviewer.  
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Participants were asked to “convince the interviewer that [they] are easily 
influenced by pressure from other people.” Then asked to “go along with everything the 
interviewer says to you.” There is strong language that focuses on the verbal interaction 
with the researcher presenting the assessments, but less focus on responding to pen and 
paper assessments that were provided by the assessor by potentially not assessed as being 
applicable. This could suggest that the written assessments were not approached in the 
same way in which the GSS-1, an interactive assessment, was approached by the 
participants in the feigning group. It is unclear whether additional instructions that 
specifically mention feigning on written assessments would impact the scores in a similar 
manner.  
Alternatively, the participants could have manipulated their scores, but chose a 
pattern that was not sufficient. The instructions to avoid overt detection may have led to 
some inconsistent attempts at changing their responses that did not result in significant 
changes in scores. For example, the sliding scale of response options within the PAI and 
the instructions to maintain believability may have led to only mild alterations of 
reporting. Although the current study did not intend to assess clinical scales presented in 
assessments such as the PAI, future studies could assess for any differences that arise on 
clinical scales, especially in a more clinically diverse sample. Future research is 
necessary to see if the absence of significant findings was related in part to the sample 
size, or if the manipulation as presented is truly insufficient to cause the desired change. 
With respect to GCS scores, while no significant differences were found, a 
medium practical effect was seen for the manipulation group. This was the expected 
direction of the results due to the face-validity of the test and the ease in which 
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participants could anticipate the nature of the questioning. It is interesting that groups did 
not significantly differ, but these findings lend support to the hypothesis that the pattern 
chosen to manipulate scores was simply ineffective, not absent. 
Interestingly, there were no differences on TOMM scores between groups, 
indicating that participants did not attempt to feign memory deficits when attempting to 
comply with the manipulation instructions. Because this assessment is interactive with 
the researcher administering the assessments, and is presented as a memory task similar 
to how the GSS-1 is framed, these results are surprising and give an interesting look into 
the patterns that the individuals chose to respond. This may be related to the specificity of 
the feedback given after each TOMM response. Having the GSS-1 and its negative 
feedback administered prior to the TOMM administration, participants may have been 
more comforted by the continuous positive and negative feedback presented within the 
TOMM protocol, which inclined participants to respond in a more genuine manner. 
Further, when choosing a method in which to respond in accordance with the 
manipulation instructions, it is possible that the participants did not believe that appearing 
to have memory deficits would assist in their cause, thereby not being caught in the 
TOMM’s trap.  
Integration of Findings and the Statement of the Problem 
Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton (2012) explored factors relevant to findings during a 
suspected police-induced false confession evaluation to increase effectiveness and 
acceptability of expert witness testimony within the United States. They suggest that it is 
imperative to examine both interrogative factors and personal characteristics to best 
understand whether the conditions were right to elicit a false confession. The authors 
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proposed that after a throughout investigation of the interrogation is conducted, a 
psychological evaluation of the false confessor is necessary; this includes a clinical 
interview that is supplemented by a battery of clinical assessment tools to substantiate 
qualitative claims (Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 2012). However, they make no suggestions 
as to which assessments should be utilized and do not mention areas of concern that 
could arise during these evaluations, such as indicators to assess for individuals with 
ulterior motives that claim they have falsely confessed. This could undercut the validity 
of false confession literature as assumed by the Judge when accepting false confession 
testimony under Daubert rules. Therefore, this study was conducted to bolster the 
continued use of the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale within the forensic realm. 
Findings support the prevailing belief within the literature that individuals can 
suppress both Immediate and Delayed Recall scores following instruction to feign with 
relative ease. Contrary to the bulk of the literature, the current findings suggest that the 
primary subscales of the GSS-1 are relatively immune to feigning efforts when 
administered with the time delay and a sufficiently demanding distractor task, as 
indicated by inability for participants to significantly alter their Yield 1, Yield 2, Shift, or 
Total Suggestibility scores within the present study. This could be in part due to 
participants within the study not being able to “fully grasp the idea behind the GSS.” (p. 
227, Hansen, Smeets, & Jelicic, 2010), such that the response patterns chosen did not 
sufficiently attend to the means in which the GSS-1 measures suggestibility. However, 
the findings of the current study suggest that the addition of the full-time delay, in 
conjunction with a sufficiently engaging cognitive tasks such as a personality assessment 
tool, is sufficient in decreasing ability to manipulate suggestibility scores. This is in line 
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with the findings of Drake et al. (2012), who emphasize the need for increased cognitive 
demands to thwart feigning attempts. 
This finding also suggests that, when administered the full GSS-1 protocol, the 
response patterns of instructed feigners are able to be differentiated from truly vulnerable 
individuals, decreasing the concern for false identification raised in previous research for 
the primary subscales of the GSS-1. This does not mean that considerations from 
previous literature that should be discarded, especially if the GSS-1 is administered 
following protocols that decrease the cognitive demands of individuals intending to feign. 
For example, Boon, Baxter, and Hall (2008) suggest that there are warning flags that may 
indicate feigning such as significant yielding to the initial presentation of leading 
questions, as indicated by higher Yield 1 scores, with lack of response to negative 
feedback, as indicated by low Shift scores. While the current study does not support these 
hypotheses, the qualitative differences in instructions between the feigning groups 
mimics the differences in how the assessment could be presented to an instructed feigner, 
thereby eliciting different response patterns. Further, if participants had additional 
knowledge on the GSS-1 beyond that presented in the current study, that may bring about 
findings similar to those in previous literature 
Limitations of the Study 
While the results of the study add to the literature in the field, there are several 
limitations that should be considered when interpreting the results. First, although efforts 
were taken to account for the small size of the current sample, the current study was 
limited the ability to find significant group differences. This is more apparent with the 
larger effect sizes identifying group differences on the PAI rather than the GSS-1, which 
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should be interpreted with caution until a replication study can be performed with 
adequate sampling. However, the current findings regarding the response to the GSS-1 
following instruction should be used to inform both clinical and research practices.  
Second, recently concerns have been raised regarding the generalizability of 
feigning literature utilizing undergraduate participants to forensic cases in which they are 
intended to be compared. It is undeniable that the motivation to feign in a research study 
and the motivation to feign within the clinical setting are vastly different. When 
discussing the limitations of their findings, Baxter et al. (2013) are the first authors to 
consider that their undergraduate participants “had no reason to work that hard” (p.923) 
when engaging in the manipulation, and propose that additional incentives are necessary 
to increase engagement with the manipulation. Although the present study was the first to 
offer additional incentive to those within the feigning condition, it is unclear whether the 
motivation utilized could garner similar manipulation engagement seen within 
individuals who truly desire to feign. 
Finally, the present study did not include a full battery of assessments that one 
could administer during a forensic evaluation exploring the veracity of a false confession 
claim. Although assessment tools were utilized that specifically assessed for memory 
malingering, this may not best account for all approaches an individual could take to 
appear more suggestible. There are qualitative differences between attempting to feign 
psychiatric symptomology and/or memory deficits as traditionally conceptualized by 
malingering and the behaviors that are necessary in order to feign heightened 
suggestibility. While similar, assessing for malingering may not be sufficient to 
understand these disingenuine responding pattern. Therefore, a broader array of 
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assessments could contain be utilized to better account for these differences. This should 
continue to be examined in future research.  
Implication for Future Research 
The findings of the current study can be used to influence both future research within 
the field of false confession research, as well as impact the way in which experts evaluate 
false confession claim evaluations. It has been difficult to generalize past research 
findings to clinical applications due to the shifting GSS-1 administration that have not 
followed the recommended procedures. The administration manual suggests that by 
eliminating the delay the overall difficulty of the assessment is decreased due to the 
recently of the narrative administration (Gudjonsson, 1997). By removing the 50-minute 
delay and shortening the administration time of the GSS-1, researchers may have 
inadvertently lowered the cognitive demand required to feign, thereby artificially 
increasing the ability or desire to appear more vulnerable when presented with the Yield 
1 questions. Future research may be inclined to replicate Smeets et al. (2009) to assess 
the impact of the various administration changes when manipulation intent of the 
administration is also considered.  
In addition, researchers should continue to assess whether individuals instructed to 
feign heightened suggestibility scores would also be likely to change their verbal and 
written behavior on a variety of assessment tools that would likely be administered in the 
forensic setting alongside the GSS-1. These should include malingering assessments and 
similar response validity assessments to assess for the variety of means in which the 
general population may choose to appear more vulnerable. If possible, this should also be 
examined with a forensic population to bolster generalizability.  
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Clinical Implications 
Presently, admissibility of expert witness testimony supporting false confession 
claims are mixed at best. While there is a robust peer reviewed literature base that 
highlights empirically-supported individual and interrogative facets that increase the 
likelihood of false confession rates (See Kassin et al., 2010), the admissibility of this 
testimony only more recently accepted (Crane v. Kentucky,1986). Under Daubert rules of 
evidence (Daubert Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 1993), the presiding judge acts as 
the gatekeeper for admitting confession expert witness testimony. While this has 
increased the admission of testimony in cases where claims of false confessions are 
made, it also raises the burden of proof needed to be deemed as supported by the 
scientific community. While the tides turn towards increased acceptance of confession 
literature as indicated by the numerous cases presented by Frumkin, Lally, and Sexton 
(2012), research must continue to explore the best clinical practices and 
recommendations to increase the precision of these evaluation.  
This study supports the findings of the most recent feigning literature (Hansen, 
Smeets, & Jelicic, 2010). The present study further proposes that the GSS-1 is resistant to 
feigning efforts primarily when the participant is administered the GSS-1 in its full 
format, with a relevant distractor task such as a personality assessment too. While no 
significant findings were seen on the primary subscales beyond Initial and Delayed 
Recall scores, it is still imperative for forensic psychologists employ caution and good 
clinical practice when utilizing the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale during a false 
confession assessment. When interpreting individual assessment responses, especially in 
cases where there is a heightened motivation to manipulate verbal and written behavior, 
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researchers should continue to assess for inaccuracies within the GSS-1 scales.  
It is important to consider that within the course of law, “items of evidence do not 
appear in a vacuum; rather, they appear through the presentations of attorneys and the 
theories they espouse in their opening statements and closing arguments.” (p137, 
Appleby & Kassin, 2016). As such, it is imperative that GSS-1 scores are not interpreted 
without the context of other information. In forensic false confession cases, detailed 
analyses of the interrogation are also necessary for the psychologist to understand what 
factors that the individual might have reacted to during an interrogation. Gudjonsson 
suggests that the GSS-1 scores “should not be interpreted in isolation from other 
information, including that obtained during a clinical interview” (p.29; 1997). The unique 
combination of interrogation factors and personal factors are the focus of these forensic 
evaluations to help determine if someone’s suggestibility level contributed to a false 
confession (Frumkin, Lally, & Sexton, 2012).  These can be incorporated into other 
clinical information gathered through other psychological testing and through a clinical 
interview with the alleged false confessor. Overall, this information should be used to 
better understand how the individual might behave in a brief interrogation considering the 
totality of the information collected during a clinical interview. 
Finally, research unanimously supports the addition of a variety of safeguards to 
protect against wrongful convictions in cases where false confessions are elicited, which 
include adapting police interrogation procedures and policies to increasing support for 
expert witness testimony supporting false confession claims (Appleby & Kassin, 2016; 
Kassin et al, 2010). The current study aims to help forensic psychologists conducting 
these forensic evaluations increase their precision to further benefit those who falsely 
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confess or are wrongly convicted. 
Conclusions 
This study aimed to assess whether participants instructed to feign higher 
suggestibility could significantly alter their verbal behavior to better understand if similar 
feigning could occur in the context of a false confession evaluation. Findings indicate that 
instructed feigners cannot successfully manipulate responses to the GSS-1 beyond the 
recall scores. Instructions to feign elevated participant’s motivation to respond 
inconsistently, as indicated by the PAI, however the instructions did not significantly 
impact other clinical assessment tools. Further, despite free recall scores being most 
consistently cited within the GSS-1 literature as the most susceptible measure to feigning 
instructions, the TOMM was unable to differentiate these participant from the control 
group. This indicates that the suppression strategy utilized by these individuals is 
different than those traditionally utilized by memory malingerers. Given these findings, 
future research should continue to explore assessments that are utilized alongside clinical 
evaluations for false confession claims to assess for suspected feigning.  
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APPENDICIES 
APPENDIX A 
Previous Research Group Instructions 
Baxter and Bain (2002): “Faking” Group Instructions: 
“The interviewer is going to interview you about the content of two stories you’ll 
hear. What I’d like you to do is to role-play being a suspect in a criminal 
investigation who may get off the hook if they can convince the interviewer that 
they are very gullible or very susceptible to pressure, that they are likely to accept 
whatever is said to them uncritically, and are therefore an unreliable witness. 
However, please do not go in for amateur dramatics or answer wildly. Try to 
concentrate on appearing gullible—but not stupid—by giving the interviewer 
whatever she seems to want. The interviewer doesn’t know who is being given 
this information and who isn’t, so it’s important that you don’t let her know what 
I’ve said to you.” (p. 221) 
Woolston, Bain, and Baxter (2006): “Misled” Group Instructions 
‘‘You are going to be interviewed regarding the content of a story that you will be 
told. You should attempt to play the role of someone who is a suspect in a 
criminal investigation. You should try to comply and go along with everything the 
interviewer says to you, as though you accept everything that is said to you 
without question. The interviewer is unaware of the instructions that you have 
been given, so please do not let them know what you have been told.’’ (p. 456) 
Boon, Gozna, and Hall (2008): “Faking Bad” Group Instructions: 
“Your role is that of a suspect in a police investigation. Acting in that role you are 
about to take a memory test as part of that investigation. Your role is to behave to 
the best of your ability as a suspect would who believed that she/he would be 
more likely to be found innocent if she/he appeared highly gullible, i.e. easily led 
and likely to accept anything that was said to them. The interviewer does not 
know I’m telling you this. Try to convince the interviewer into believing that you 
are highly gullible. Try to do this as if your freedom depended upon it i.e. try not 
to give the interviewer any clue that you are acting.” (p. 267-268)  
Hansen, Smeets, and Jelicic (2010): “Misled” Group Instructions 
“You are going to be interviewed regarding the content of a story that will be told. 
You should attempt to play the role of someone who is a suspect in a criminal 
investigation. You have the chance of getting off the hook if you can convince the 
interviewer that you are easily influenced. You should try to trick the interviewer 
into believing that you are susceptible to accepting leading questions, that is, 
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questions that may assume or imply information that is not completely true or is 
misleading. You will also be given a couple of statements with which you can 
either agree or not agree. Again your chances to get off the hook rise, if you 
respond in a certain way. Let the interviewer believe that you are eager to please 
other people and you try to avoid conflicts with others. The interviewer is 
unaware of the instructions that you have been given, so please do not let him 
know what you have read.” (p. 224) 
Current Study: Feigning Group Instructions 
“You are going to be given multiple assessments today. You should attempt to 
play the role of someone who is a suspect in a criminal investigation. You have 
the chance of getting off the hook if you can convince the interviewer that you are 
easily influenced by pressure from other people. You should try to go along with 
everything the interviewer says to you, as though you accept everything that is 
said to you without question. However, please do not go in for amateur dramatics 
or answer wildly. Try to concentrate on appearing gullible—but not stupid—by 
giving the interviewer whatever they seem to want. If you are determined to be 
the most credible faker in the research study, you will be compensated with a $50 
Publix Gift card. The interviewer is unaware of the instructions that you have 
been given, so please do not let them know what you have read here. When you 
have finished reading this letter, please fold it and return it to the envelope.” 
Current Study: Control Group Instructions 
“You are going to be given multiple assessments today. Please complete the 
assessments as you normally would. You should attempt to complete the 
assessments to the best of your ability. The interviewer is unaware of the 
instructions that you have been given, so please do not let them know what you 
have read here. When you have finished reading this letter, please fold it and 
return it to the envelope.” 
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APPENDIX B 
Recruitment Flyer 
Attention Nova Southeastern 
Undergraduate Students!! 
We are looking for undergraduate students 
to participate in a research study entitled 
“Evaluation of Forensic Assessment Tools.” 
Students must be currently enrolled at 
Nova Southeastern University as an 
undergraduate student, speak and read 
English fluently, and must be over the age 
of 18.  
 
The study should take about 1.5 hours to 
complete, and participants will receive a 
$20 Publix gift card after participating as a 
thank you. If you are interested, please 
email sg1543@mynsu.nova.edu to set up 
a date and time to participate. Thank you! 
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APPENDIX C 
Informed Consent 
Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study Entitled 
Evaluation of Forensic Assessment Tools 
 
IRB protocol #  
 
Principal investigator    Co-investigator 
Stephen Grabner, M.S   Jonathan Shook, M.S. 
3301 College Ave.      3301 College Ave. 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314    Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314 
(954) 262-5705     (954) 262-5705 
 
Co-investigator 
David Shapiro, Ph.D 
3301 College Ave, 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314 
(954) 262-5705 
 
For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact: 
Human Research Oversight Board (Institutional Review Board or IRB)  
Nova Southeastern University 
(954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 866-499-0790 
IRB@nsu.nova.edu 
 
Site Information 
Nova Southeastern University 
College of Psychology 
3301 College Ave, 
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314 
 
What is the study about? 
You are invited to participate in a research study aimed to better understand how 
responses on four different assessment tools used by psychologists in forensic 
evaluations could be related.  
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Why are you asking me? 
We are inviting you to participate because you are an undergraduate student at Nova 
Southeastern University, you are over the age of 18, and you speak and write English 
fluently.  
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study? 
Over the course of approximately two hours you will be answering a set of four 
assessment instruments given to you by a research team member. These assessments 
include two paper-and-pencil assessments which require you to answer a number of 
questions about yourself and how you view the world. The other two assessments are 
memory tests that are administered verbally and visually by a research assistant. 
Is there any audio or video recording? 
This research project will include audio recording as part of the two memory 
assessments given in order to accurately score your responses. This audio recording will 
be available to be heard by the lead researchers, personnel from the IRB, and research 
assistants. When listening to the recording, research assistants will use earphones to 
ensure your privacy. The recording will be kept securely in Dr. Shapiro’s office in a 
locked cabinet and will not be shared with individuals that are not involved in the study.  
The recording will be kept up to 36 months from the end of the study. The recording will 
be destroyed after that time by deleting all copies of the recording. Because your voice 
will be potentially identifiable by anyone who hears the recording, your confidentiality for 
things you say on the recording cannot be guaranteed, although the researcher will try to 
limit access to the tape as described in this paragraph.  
What are the dangers to me? 
Risks to you are minimal, meaning they are not thought to be greater than other risks 
you experience every day. Being recorded means that confidentiality cannot be 
promised. However, the precautions regarding privacy of the statements that you make, 
as described above, will be taken to reduce any risk others hearing your responses. 
Reading some of the questions in the assessments may bring back unhappy memories. 
If this happens, the research assistant will try to help you. If you need further help, they 
will suggest someone you can see in connection with the university through the student 
counseling center.  If you have questions about the research, your research rights, or if 
you experience an injury because of the research, please contact Dr. Shapiro at (954) 
262-5894.  You may also contact the IRB at the numbers indicated on page 1 with 
questions about your research rights.  
Are there any benefits to me for taking part in this research study? 
There are no benefits to you for participating at this time.  
Will I get paid for being in the study?  Will it cost me anything? 
There are no costs to you to participate. You will be compensated through a $20 Publix 
gift cards given after the completion of the assessments. 
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How will you keep my information private? 
The questionnaires will not ask you for any information that could be directly linked to 
you, and the recordings will be stored in a locked box. All participants will be assigned a 
code to replace their name, and all information will be stored under that code to minimize 
the risk of specific participant identification.  As mentioned, the recordings will be 
destroyed 36 months after the study ends. All information obtained in this study is strictly 
confidential unless disclosure is required by law.  The IRB, regulatory agencies, or Dr. 
Shapiro may review research records. 
What if I do not want to participate or I want to leave the study? 
You have the right to leave this study at any time or refuse to participate. If you do 
decide to leave or you decide not to participate, you will not experience any penalty or 
loss of services you have a right to receive.  If you choose to withdraw, any information 
collected about you before the date you leave the study will be kept in the research 
records for up to 36 months from the conclusion of the study and may be used as a part 
of the research. 
Other Considerations: 
If the researchers learn anything which might change your mind about being involved, 
you will be told of this information.  
Voluntary Consent by Participant: 
By signing below, you indicate that 
• this study has been explained to you 
• you have read this document or it has been read to you 
• your questions about this research study have been answered 
• you have been told that you may ask the researchers any study related questions 
in the future or contact them in the event of a research-related injury 
• you have been told that you may ask Institutional Review Board (IRB) personnel 
questions about your study rights 
• you are entitled to a copy of this form after you have read and signed it 
• you voluntarily agree to participate in the study entitled Evaluation of Forensic 
Assessment Tools 
 
Participant's Signature: ___________________________ Date: ________________ 
 
Participant’s Name: ______________________________ Date: ________________ 
 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent: _____________________________   
 
Date: ___________________________ 
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APPENDIX D 
Demographics Questionnaire 
Please complete the following Demographic Questions 
Age: ________________________ Gender: __________________________ 
Race/Ethnicity: ________________________ 
Level of education: _______________________________________________ 
 
